ASEAN and the Dynamics of Resistance to Sovereignty Violation: The Case of the Third Indochina War (1978–1991)

Abstract

This article investigates the history of ASEAN's relationship to external intervention in regional affairs. It addresses a specific question: What was the basic cause of the success of ASEAN resistance to the Vietnamese challenge to ASEAN's sovereignty from 1978-1991? ASEAN's history is understood in terms of a realist theoretical logic, in terms of the relationship between an ASEAN state with the most compelling interests at stake in a given issue, which I call a 'vanguard state,' and selected external powers. Using the Third Indochina War (1978)(1979)(1980)(1981)(1982)(1983)(1984)(1985)(1986)(1987)(1988)(1989)(1990)(1991) as a case study, this article contends that ASEAN's ability to resist violations to the sovereignty of Thailand from a Soviet-backed Vietnam is a consequence of high interest convergence between Thailand, and a designated external power, China.

Enter the Vanguard State: Reinterpreting ASEAN’s Response to the South China Sea Issue

“…This section contains and expands upon the theoretical argument first outlined in the work of Southgate, (2015, pp. 200–221).…”

“…Thus, ASEAN can be understood as a unified entity during those periods when ASEAN displays a united front in support of a/the vanguard state(s). This occurred during the Cold War, when Thailand acted as ASEAN's vanguard state and established significant interest convergence with an external actor, the People's Republic of China from 1979-1991(Southgate, 2015. Despite divisions within ASEAN, the organization was sufficiently unified to act as a unitary actor in Frey's terms, and projected an admittedly far from perfect, but still cohesive united front.…”