Ashamed to be selfish

Dillenberger, David; Sadowski, Philipp

doi:10.3982/te674

Cited by 57 publications

(24 citation statements)

References 27 publications

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“… Still more research argues that giving may be due to feelings of shame (Tadelis ; Dillenberger and Sadowski ), guilt (Battigalli and Dufwenberg ), and social pressure from observers (Andreoni and Bernheim ).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Market Interaction and Pro‐Social Behavior: An Experimental Study

Collins

Hamman²,

Lightle³

2017

Southern Economic Journal

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When actions generate negative externalities for third parties, incentives exist to pass these “morally costly” decisions to others. In laboratory experiments, we investigate how market interaction affects allocations when the right to divide a sum of money between oneself and a passive recipient is commoditized. Allocation to recipients is reduced by more than half when determined by subjects who purchase or keep the right to make the division as compared to a control where subjects are directly assigned the right. Sellers report accurate beliefs about recipient allocations and do not report feeling less responsible the more often they sell the allocation right. The market allocates the right to make divisions more frequently to buyers who allocate more to recipients, but sellers who allocate less to recipients tend to sell less often. Selection cannot solely explain the results, suggesting market interaction itself may directly impact behavior.

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confidence: 99%

Market Interaction and Pro‐Social Behavior: An Experimental Study

Collins

Hamman²,

Lightle³

2017

Southern Economic Journal

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“…Theorem 1 shows that every such a preference has an extension to the lottery setting. However, this extension cannot satisfy SM for OSM would follow 4 . It follows that Kreps' OSM assumption characterizes those preferences which can be extended to the lottery setting preserving the desire for flexibility.…”

Section: Model and Main Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…To simplify the exposition, all proofs are collected in the Appendix. 1 The topics studied include: preference for flexibility [1], [3], [13], [15], [23], temptation and self-control [1], [2], [3], [7], [8], [11], [17], [18], [19], [20], [21], guilt [4], perfectionism [10], self-deception [12], regret [24], contemplation costs [5], [6] and thinking aversion [22].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Additive Representation for Preferences Over Menus in Finite Choice Settings

Gorno¹

2010

SSRN Journal

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“… In a menu preference framework, Dillenberger and Sadowski () note that when agents anticipate experiencing guilt or shame when they deviate from a social norm, their choices can also violate WARP. …”

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confidence: 99%

Willpower and compromise effect

Masatlıoĝlu

Nakajima²,

Ozdenoren³

2020

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This paper provides a behavioral foundation for modeling willpower as a limited cognitive resource that bridges the standard utility maximization and Strotz models. Using the agent's ex ante preferences and ex post choices, we derive a representation that captures key behavioral traits of willpower-constrained decision making. We use the model to study the pricing problem of a profit-maximizing monopolist who faces consumers with limited willpower. We show that the optimal contract often consists of three alternatives and that the consumer's choices reflect a form of the "compromise effect," which is induced endogenously. 5 Strotz (1955) proposed a model of changing tastes with consistent planning. In a framework where the agent has preferences over finite decision trees, Gul and Pesendorfer (2005) provide an axiomatization of the Strotz model of consistent planning. 6 In a menu preference framework, Dillenberger and Sadowski (2012) note that when agents anticipate experiencing guilt or shame when they deviate from a social norm, their choices can also violate WARP. 7 The idea that self-control costs can be convex has been introduced by Fudenberg and Levine (2006). 8 In the remainder of the paper, we refer to the costly self-control models with linear and convex costs as linear and convex self-control models, respectively.

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Ashamed to be selfish

Cited by 57 publications

References 27 publications

Market Interaction and Pro‐Social Behavior: An Experimental Study

Market Interaction and Pro‐Social Behavior: An Experimental Study

Additive Representation for Preferences Over Menus in Finite Choice Settings

Willpower and compromise effect

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