Aspects of Reason

Abstract

This book, based on Grice's 1979 Locke Lectures at Oxford and published posthumously, elaborates the notions of reasons, reasoning, and rationality, with particular emphasis on the unity of practical and non‐practical (‘alethic’) reasoning. It begins with a look at the nature of ordinary reasoning and distinguishes between ‘flat rationality’, the formal capacity to apply inferential rules, and ‘variable rationality’, the excellence or competence of good reasoning (Ch. 1). Grice then proposes an ‘Equivocality Thesis’, arguing that a structural representation can be given for justificatory (normative) reasons that allows for modals (ought, must, etc.) to be used univocally across the alethic/practical divide in terms of general acceptability statements (Chs. 2–3). In addition, he shows that valid inferences can be drawn from alethic to practical acceptability statements (Ch. 4). Finally, Grice provides a characterization of happiness as it features in practical thinking, and suggests it to be an ‘inclusive end’, consisting of the realization of other ends that are desirable for their own sake as well as for the sake of happiness (Ch. 5). An extensive introduction by Richard Warner provides a helpful summary and explanation of key aspects of the book.

It's Ok to Make Mistakes: Against the Fixed Point Thesis

“…I will not consider this in detail, primarily because even if intuition can provide a reliable guide to truths about the rational requirements, it is unclear how subjects could distinguish genuine intuitions from subjective feelings of obviousness, and so an intuition-based motivation seems to face the same problems as one based on subjective obviousness. 7 See (Grice, 2001;Harman, 1986;Hawthorne & Bovens, 1999;Macfarlane, ms.) Then again, Titelbaum also emphasises the importance of considering agents' situations in determining their rationality. He thinks that the presence or absence of 'rational flaws' can be determined by evaluating an agent's 'state against her situation ' (2015b: 259).…”

Are Fallacies Vices?

“…In Aspects of Reason, Grice (2001) claims that we reason under the assumption that there exist principles of good reasoning that have some sort of normative force (p. 5). Grice notes three points: First, ''the discrimination and systemization of acceptable principles of inference provide for us […] models, by reference to which we may understand actual reasonings''; Second, such models are normative since they direct how reasoning should or ought to proceed; Third, these models are characterized as normative because they all come together in a ''conceptual province'' that is ''specially connected with living creatures,'' i.e., rational agents (pp.…”

Prolegomena to Default Semantics

“…Grice (2001). Acc ├ p "it is acceptable that it is the case that p" for epistemic/alethic modality, and Acc !…”