Aspiration-based coevolution of node weights promotes cooperation in the spatial prisoner’s dilemma game

Chu, Chen; Mu, Chunjiang; Liu, Jinzhuo; Liu, Chen; Boccaletti, Stefano; Ши, Лей; Wang, Zhen

doi:10.1088/1367-2630/ab0999

Cited by 50 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 30 publications

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“…The strategic situation in which competitors make different decisions according to the condition of selection pressure may be analyzed with Game Theory [4]. In general, Game Theory formalism is based on competitor behavioral decision making on an individual basis; however, the payoff for each player will depend on the decision made by all competitors who are interacting [5].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The key issue of Game Theory is the understanding of the reasons for decisions given by certain scenarios and their consequences for population fitness under specific conditions [6]. The prisoner's dilemma is a standard example of Game Theory, which shows why two individuals may not cooperate [4,7]. Game Theory can jointly consider the ecological and evolutionary dynamics of competitors [8].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Shifts in Ecological Dominance between Two Lepidopteran Species in Refuge Areas of Bt Cotton

Malaquias

Santana

Degrande

et al. 2021

Insects

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Competition behavior involving agricultural pest species has long been viewed as a powerful selective force that drives ecological and phenotypic diversity. In this context, a Game Theory-based approach may be useful to describe the decision-making dilemma of a competitor with impacts to guarantee its superiority in terms of ecological dominance or sharing of the food resource with its competitor. In an attempt to elucidate the consequences of competitive dynamics for the ecological dominance of these species in refuge areas of Bt cotton, we conducted a study that was divided into two parts. The first study consisted of an evaluation of interactions involving Spodoptera frugiperda (JE Smith, 1797) and Helicoverpa armigera (Hübner, 1808) on non-Bt cotton plants in a field trial. In the second study, we explored the data matrix collected in the field to parameterize a model of Cellular Automata (CA) with update rules inspired by Game Theory. Computer simulations were analyzed in hypothetical scenarios involving the application (or not) of insecticides in the refuge areas in combination with the resistance factor of one or both pest species to the insecticides used in the refuge areas. H. armigera had superior competitive performance in relation to S. frugiperda only at high densities. According to the density-mediated shift in dominance of the species, the resistance of S. frugiperda to insecticides is seen as a risk factor for the production of susceptible individuals of H. armigera on a large scale in the refuge areas. Additionally, S. frugiperda insecticide resistance may potentially impact the resistance evolution of the H. armigera population to Bt cotton. Thus, ecological dominance could diverge by the presence of a resistance allele to insecticides with interspecific competition perhaps subordinate to evolutionary processes.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Shifts in Ecological Dominance between Two Lepidopteran Species in Refuge Areas of Bt Cotton

Malaquias

Santana

Degrande

et al. 2021

Insects

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show abstract

“…Previous theoretical studies aiming to model the evolution of social norms mainly fall into two categories [50]: (1) game-theoretical models and (2) opinion dynamics models. The gametheoretical models concentrate on the question of how the commitment to one specific norm can be reached in the presence of social dilemma, such as cooperation norm [39,49,[51][52][53][54] or coordination norm [2,55]. The opinion dynamics models attempt to understand how one of several possible behavior can establish a norm [56][57][58].…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Evolution of egalitarian social norm by resource management

Chen

Wang

2020

PLoS ONE

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Social organizations, especially human society, rely on egalitarian social norm, which can be characterized by high levels of fairness, empathy and collective conformity. Nevertheless, the evolution of egalitarian social norm remains a conundrum, as it suffers the persistent challenge from individual self-interest. To address this issue, we construct an evolutionary game theoretical model by employing the Ultimatum Game, in which rational individuals are able to perform resource management. We show that resource management drives a population evolving into an oscillatory state with high equilibrium degrees of fairness, empathy and collective conformity and thus constitutes a key mechanism for the evolution of egalitarian social norm in social dilemma situations. Specifically, it results in (1) the formation of egalitarian social norm from diverse individual norms, (2) the emergence of egalitarian social norm in a selfish and unfair world, and (3) the maintenance of egalitarian social norm despite the presence of norm violators. The constructive role of resource management is explained by a mean-field analysis revealing that resource management can effectively enlarge the attraction basin of egalitarian norms or even change the dynamical property of the mini Ultimatum Game from bistability between egalitarian norms and less egalitarian norms to complete-dominance of egalitarian norms over less egalitarian norms. Furthermore, we find that the capacity of resource management can be evolutionarily selected by a coevolution between egalitarian social norm and resource management. Our study suggests that efficiency and equity are linked to each other. OPEN ACCESSCitation: Wang X, Chen X, Wang L (2020) Evolution of egalitarian social norm by resource management. PLoS ONE 15(1): e0227902. https://

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“…In recent years, aspiration-based strategy updating rules have got more and more attention from researchers [21,22,23,24,25,26,27,28,29]. A representative model is that compared to maximize their payoffs, individuals usually tend to keep their strategies when they feel satisfied, otherwise they try to learn what others do, which is called Win-Stay-Lose-Learn strategy updating rule and there have been some related studies in recent years [30,31,32].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…A representative model is that compared to maximize their payoffs, individuals usually tend to keep their strategies when they feel satisfied, otherwise they try to learn what others do, which is called Win-Stay-Lose-Learn strategy updating rule and there have been some related studies in recent years [30,31,32]. In most of the above research, aspiration is a fixed value which is set for all individuals before the evolution process begins [21,22,23,24,30,31,32]. In fact, dynamic aspiration models meet the actual situation better and there are also some related researches [25,26,27,28,29].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Effects of Dynamic-Win-Stay-Lose-Learn model with voluntary participation in social dilemma

Shi,

Wei,

Feng

et al. 2021

Preprint

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In recent years, Win-Stay-Lose-Learn rule has attracted wide attention as an effective strategy updating rule, and voluntary participation is proposed by introducing a third strategy in Prisoner's dilemma game. Some researches show that combining Win-Stay-Lose-Learn rule with voluntary participation could promote cooperation more significantly under moderate temptation values, however, cooperators' survival under high aspiration levels and high temptation values is still a challenging problem. In this paper, inspired by Achievement Motivation Theory, a Dynamic-Win-Stay-Lose-Learn rule with voluntary participation is investigated, where a dynamic aspiration process is introduced to describe the co-evolution of individuals' strategies and aspirations. It is found that cooperation is extremely promoted and defection is almost extinct in our model, even when the initial aspiration levels and temptation values are high. The combination of dynamic aspiration and voluntary participation play an active role since loners could survive under high initial aspiration levels and they will expand stably because of their fixed payoffs. The robustness of our model is also discussed and some adverse structures are found which should be alerted in the evolutionary process. Our work provides a more realistic model and shows that cooperators may prevail defectors in an unfavorable initial environment.

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Aspiration-based coevolution of node weights promotes cooperation in the spatial prisoner’s dilemma game

Cited by 50 publications

References 30 publications

Shifts in Ecological Dominance between Two Lepidopteran Species in Refuge Areas of Bt Cotton

Shifts in Ecological Dominance between Two Lepidopteran Species in Refuge Areas of Bt Cotton

Evolution of egalitarian social norm by resource management

Effects of Dynamic-Win-Stay-Lose-Learn model with voluntary participation in social dilemma

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