Aspiration-Based Partner Switching Boosts Cooperation in Social Dilemmas

Li, Zhi; Yang, Zhihu; Wu, Te; Wang, Long

doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0097866

Cited by 18 publications

(10 citation statements)

References 59 publications

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“…Amazingly, promotion effect on cooperation with Moore neighborhood, in fact, appears even far stronger than that for von Neumann neighborhood in this figure. This phenomenon differs apparently from previous observations concerning dynamically organized partnerships [91][92][93][94] and also yeast societies [95], where authors argue that denser networks often exhibit apparent propensity to deter the establishment of cooperation. The existence of M opt emphasizes that rewarding agents whose strategy popularity slightly oversteps half size of their neighborhoods (referred to as the minimum majority) most benefits the evolution of cooperation no matter in which kind of games.…”

Section: Resultscontrasting

confidence: 99%

Evolution of cooperation driven by majority-pressure based interdependence

Yang

Kim

et al. 2018

New J. Phys.

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The evolution of cooperation on interdependent networks is arousing increasing concern based on the fact that more and more complex systems in the real-world have been proven to be organized in the form of multi-layer networks rather than single-layer networks. In this study, we examine the effects of self-organized interdependence on the evolution and stabilization of cooperation with social dilemmas depicted by the Prisoner's Dilemma Game (PDG) and the Public Goods Game (PGG) in which agents with the most common strategy have the chance to be rewarded proportionally to the fitness of corresponding agents belonging to the other network. We show that such a type-free rewarding rule, independent of game strategy, establishes a time-varying interdependence between two initially independent populations whereby cooperation is highly promoted as well as stabilized both in the two-player PDG and in the multi-player PGG. Majority-pressure based interdependence at stake has proven pretty neutral in regard to game strategy because it is contingent on strategy configuration rather than strategy itself, which thus gives birth to homologous communities, including cooperative as well as non-cooperative, and thereby an enhanced spatial reciprocity between non-identical networks is triggered. Of particular interest is the double-edged sword effect of network interdependence on cooperation although in most instances the heavier the interdependence, the better the evolution of cooperation. Furthermore, interpretations of the nontrivial relationship between cooperation and benchmark threshold measuring the strategy's local popularity highlight that rewarding the minimum majority is optimal for the evolution of cooperation in such scenario. Finally, we claim our observations are also quite robust with respect to mutation.

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Section: Resultscontrasting

confidence: 99%

Evolution of cooperation driven by majority-pressure based interdependence

Yang

Kim

et al. 2018

New J. Phys.

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“…Du et al [32] affirmed that the effects of aspiration level on average abundance function in structured population under weak selection intensity is similar to that in well-mixed population. Li et al [33] corroborated that the combination of aspiration rule and modified selfquestioning mechanism leads to the increasing of average abundance function.…”

Section: The Comparison Between Aspiration Rule and Imitation Rulementioning

confidence: 91%

The characteristics of average abundance function with mutation of multi-player threshold public goods evolutionary game model under redistribution mechanism

Xia

2021

BMC Ecol Evo

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Background In recent years, the average abundance function has attracted much attention as it reflects the degree of cooperation in the population. Then it is significant to analyse how average abundance functions can be increased to promote the proliferation of cooperative behaviour. However, further theoretical analysis for average abundance function with mutation under redistribution mechanism is still lacking. Furthermore, the theoretical basis for the corresponding numerical simulation is not sufficiently understood. Results We have deduced the approximate expressions of average abundance function with mutation under redistribution mechanism on the basis of different levels of selection intensity $$\omega$$ ω (sufficiently small and large enough). In addition, we have analysed the influence of the size of group d, multiplication factor r, cost c, aspiration level $$\alpha$$ α on average abundance function from both quantitative and qualitative aspects. Conclusions (1) The approximate expression will become the linear equation related to selection intensity when $$\omega$$ ω is sufficiently small. (2) On one hand, approximation expression when $$\omega$$ ω is large enough is not available when r is small and m is large. On the other hand, this approximation expression will become more reliable when $$\omega$$ ω is larger. (3) On the basis of the expected payoff function $$\pi \left( \centerdot \right)$$ π ⋅ and function $$h(i,\omega )$$ h ( i , ω ) , the corresponding results for the effects of parameters (d,r,c,$$\alpha$$ α ) on average abundance function $$X_{A}(\omega )$$ X A ( ω ) have been explained.

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“…For example, Axelrod in [5] considered individuals on a twodimensional square lattice, where interactions would only happen within local neighborhoods. Vainstein et al [44] extended the model of Nowak and May [29] by considering a regular lattice where some vacant sites permit the individuals to diffuse easily; see also [32,38,7,4,48,22,43,1] for other models of dynamic networks.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Evolution of Cooperation in Mobile Populations

Suarez¹,

Suthaharan²,

Rowell³

et al. 2015

SPORA

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We consider a finite, fixed-size population of mobile cooperators and free-riders. A cooperator is an individual who, at a cost to itself, provides benefits to any and all individuals in its vicinity, whereas a free-rider does not provide any benefits and thus pays no cost. Individuals are free to move to maximize their payoff, and our model allows for the interactions among multiple individuals at the same time. Using Gillespie's algorithm, we build an exact stochastic simulation of this continuous-time Markov process and find that decreasing the individuals' mobility or decreasing the size of the interaction neighborhood promotes the fixation of cooperators in the population.

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Aspiration-Based Partner Switching Boosts Cooperation in Social Dilemmas

Cited by 18 publications

References 59 publications

Evolution of cooperation driven by majority-pressure based interdependence

Evolution of cooperation driven by majority-pressure based interdependence

The characteristics of average abundance function with mutation of multi-player threshold public goods evolutionary game model under redistribution mechanism

Evolution of Cooperation in Mobile Populations

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