Aspiration driven coevolution resolves social dilemmas in networks

Liu, Chen; Shi, Juan; Li, Tong; Liu, Jinzhuo

doi:10.1016/j.amc.2018.09.034

Cited by 31 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 53 publications

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“…In recent years, the coevolution of player strategy and network structure has been studied as an important mechanism that promotes cooperation. Many forms and driving factors of coevolution have been studied extensively [26,49,50,52], including reputation [26,52]. Reputation is a non-revenue reward for players who choose to cooperate during evolution, and becomes a social attribute.…”

Section: Conclusion and Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Trust-based partner switching among partitioned regions promotes cooperation in public goods game

et al. 2021

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In this paper, the coevolution mechanism of trust-based partner switching among partitioned regions on an adaptive network is studied. We investigate a low-information approach to building trust and cooperation in public goods games. Unlike reputation, trust scores are only given to players by those with whom they have a relationship in the game, depending on the game they play together. A player’s trust score for a certain neighbor is given and known by that player only. Players can adjust their connections to neighbors with low trust scores by switching their partners to other players. When switching partners, players divide other nodes in the network into three regions: immediate neighbors as the known region, indirectly connected second-order neighbors as the intermediate region, and other nodes as the unknown region. Such choices and compartmentalization often occur in global and regional economies. Our results show that preference for switching to partners in the intermediate region is not conducive to spreading cooperation, while random selection has the disadvantage of protecting the cooperator. However, selecting new partners in the remaining two regions based on the average trust score of the known region performs well in both protecting partners and finding potential cooperators. Meanwhile, by analyzing the parameters, we find that the influence of vigilance increasing against unsatisfactory behavior on evolution direction depends on the level of cooperation reward.

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Section: Conclusion and Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The coevolutionary game can be driven by aspiration [49,50] or empathy [51], reputation [26,52]. Reputation has been shown to have a strong influence on cooperative results in dynamic games [26], which models indirect reciprocity in human societies.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Trust-based partner switching among partitioned regions promotes cooperation in public goods game

et al. 2021

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“…Previous theoretical studies aiming to model the evolution of social norms mainly fall into two categories [50]: (1) game-theoretical models and (2) opinion dynamics models. The gametheoretical models concentrate on the question of how the commitment to one specific norm can be reached in the presence of social dilemma, such as cooperation norm [39,49,[51][52][53][54] or coordination norm [2,55]. The opinion dynamics models attempt to understand how one of several possible behavior can establish a norm [56][57][58].…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Evolution of egalitarian social norm by resource management

Chen

Wang

2020

PLoS ONE

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Social organizations, especially human society, rely on egalitarian social norm, which can be characterized by high levels of fairness, empathy and collective conformity. Nevertheless, the evolution of egalitarian social norm remains a conundrum, as it suffers the persistent challenge from individual self-interest. To address this issue, we construct an evolutionary game theoretical model by employing the Ultimatum Game, in which rational individuals are able to perform resource management. We show that resource management drives a population evolving into an oscillatory state with high equilibrium degrees of fairness, empathy and collective conformity and thus constitutes a key mechanism for the evolution of egalitarian social norm in social dilemma situations. Specifically, it results in (1) the formation of egalitarian social norm from diverse individual norms, (2) the emergence of egalitarian social norm in a selfish and unfair world, and (3) the maintenance of egalitarian social norm despite the presence of norm violators. The constructive role of resource management is explained by a mean-field analysis revealing that resource management can effectively enlarge the attraction basin of egalitarian norms or even change the dynamical property of the mini Ultimatum Game from bistability between egalitarian norms and less egalitarian norms to complete-dominance of egalitarian norms over less egalitarian norms. Furthermore, we find that the capacity of resource management can be evolutionarily selected by a coevolution between egalitarian social norm and resource management. Our study suggests that efficiency and equity are linked to each other. OPEN ACCESSCitation: Wang X, Chen X, Wang L (2020) Evolution of egalitarian social norm by resource management. PLoS ONE 15(1): e0227902. https://

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“…As long as the game revenue-cost ratio is higher than network connectivity, reciprocity and multistep prediction horizon are necessary for stable collaboration and sufficient for fixed cooperation [14]. e facilitation of cooperative behaviour mainly depends on participants' weight distribution, which is based on the formation of cooperative clusters controlled by highweight collaborators [15]. e system's general description is derived using ordinary differential equations, which provides a common framework to simulate and quantify the effects of single-node dynamics on the macroscopic state of the network [16].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Heterogeneity and Environmental Preferences Shape the Evolution of Cooperation in Supply Networks

Yue

2021

Complexity

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Supply networks as complex systems are significant challenges for decision-makers in predicting the evolution of cooperation among firms. The impact of environmental heterogeneity on firms is critical. Environment-based preference selection plays a pivotal role in clarifying the existence and maintenance of cooperation in supply networks. This paper explores the implication of the heterogeneity of environment and environment-based preference on the evolution of cooperation in supply networks. Cellular automata are considered to examine the synchronized evolution of cooperation and defection across supply networks. The Prisoner’s Dilemma Game and Snowdrift Game reward schemes have been formed, and the heterogeneous environment and environmental preference have been applied. The results show that the heterogeneous environment’s degree leads to higher cooperation for both Prisoner’s Dilemma Game and Snowdrift Game. We also probe into the impact of the environmental preference on the evolution of cooperation, and the results of which confirm the usefulness of preference of environment. This work offers a valuable perspective to improve the level of cooperation among firms and understand the evolution of cooperation in supply networks.

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Aspiration driven coevolution resolves social dilemmas in networks

Cited by 31 publications

References 53 publications

Trust-based partner switching among partitioned regions promotes cooperation in public goods game

Trust-based partner switching among partitioned regions promotes cooperation in public goods game

Evolution of egalitarian social norm by resource management

Heterogeneity and Environmental Preferences Shape the Evolution of Cooperation in Supply Networks

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