Assertion, uniqueness and epistemic hypocrisy

Abstract

This paper has two central aims. First, we motivate a puzzle. The puzzle features four independently plausible but jointly inconsistent claims. One of the four claims is the sufficiency leg of the knowledge norm of assertion (KNA-S), according to which one is properly epistemically positioned to assert that p if one knows that p. Second, we propose that rejecting (KNA-S) is the best way out of the puzzle. Our argument to this end appeals to the epistemic value of intellectual humility in social-epistemic practice.

Should I say that? An experimental investigation of the norm of assertion

“…For some critical takes on the hypothesis, seeCappelen (2011),Carter & Gordon (2011), Pagin (2016), Carter (2017,Marsili (2019). While we share a critical stance on these matters, we also think that (despite its weaknesses) Williamson's hypothesis can be a useful idealization to guide the investigation of these issues.…”

The norm of assertion: a ‘constitutive’ rule?

“…The second category comprises those who reject or challenge Williamson's hypothesis, either in part or as a whole. Some philosophers (Brown 2008, Carter 2015, Carter & Gordon 2011, Gerken 2014, Marsili 2015, McKenna 2015 reject the assumption that there is only one norm of assertion. Others have argued that assertion is not constituted by a rule of this kind (Hindriks 2007, Maitra 2011, McCammon 2014:137-9, Marsili 2015:120-1, Black 2018; cf.…”

“…I have already stressed that the C-rule to which Williamson refers is (A1), not (A3). If the C-rule is constitutive of assertion in Pollock's 'prescriptive' sense, to claim of (A1) that is constitutive of assertion is to claim that (A3*) is true of (A1) 8 . Therefore, both (A1) and (A3*) help make sense of what it means for assertion to be constituted by a norm: (A1) spells out the content of the norm, whereas (A3) postulates that assertion is necessarily subject to that norm (so that (A1) is a prescriptive rule of assertion, in Pollock's sense).…”

“…Williamson (2000:238-9) identifies two ways of conceiving a norm as essential to a practice. In a 'broad', ordinary sense, we say that a norm is essential to a practice if we cannot conceive that practice as not being ruled by 8 To be sure: to claim that (A1) is uniquely constitutive of assertion amounts to claiming that (A3*) is true of (A1). Constitutivity without uniqueness could only account for the left-to-right reading of the biconditional.…”

“…The first is the uniqueness assumption: the idea that assertion, qua assertion, is governed only by the C-rule. This assumption already rested on shaky grounds: it has been pointed out that "that there is such a unique rule is little more than an item of faith for Williamson, with no justification offered other than that a simple account consisting of such a single rule would be 'theoretically satisfying'" (DeRose 2002:fn15), and several authors explicitly argued against this view (Brown 2008, Carter 2015, Carter & Gordon 2011, Gerken 2014, McKenna 2015.…”