Assertions, Conflations and Human Nature: A Reply to Werner Bonefeld

Abstract

Keywords: Open Marxism; human social practice; production; human needs I am happy to acknowledge that my critique of Open Marxism was not too sympathetic (Bruff 2009). Nevertheless, the discussion was lengthy, detailed and full of citations. Hence my hope that, in contrast to previous responses to criticism, I would coax some self-reflection out of those of an Open Marxist persuasion (in the same way that Andreas Bieler and Adam Morton (2003) carefully considered the Open Marxist critique of neo-Gramscian International Political Economy (IPE)). For this reason I find Werner Bonefeld's (2009) response disappointing. AssertionsBonefeld barely acknowledges my discussion of Open Marxism; instead, we are informed in a couple of sentences that he finds it puzzling and that I am unclear. The subsequent (and swift) move to critique the alternative framework I sketched in the article's conclusion signals an unwillingness to engage seriously with criticism. What we have instead is simple assertion, an approach that is replicated when articulating the critical points about my position. In consequence, it seems thatunless a new generation of Open Marxist scholars emerges with a more moderate view of other strands of historical materialism-there is little potential for further dialogue. Moreover, as I will now demonstrate, the criticisms that Bonefeld makes are, as can be expected given the prior shunning of constructive engagement, wide of the mark. ConflationsAs someone who is evidently comfortable with often esoteric discussions of abstraction, it is surprising to see how Bonefeld critiques my position. In particular, he repeatedly conflates transhistorical aspects of human social practice with human social practice in all of its complexity and richness. This is a serious error, because I made it clear that 'the need to produce is essential to our existence; the way in which such production is organised is not ... Therefore, the "how" of production is not a functional response to the "what" of production' (Bruff 2009, 346-347). Nevertheless, through this elision Bonefeld is able then to posit that I adhere to 'a historical materialism based on the natural sciences' (Bonefeld 2009, 356). This is unwarranted given my attempts to show how 'human social practice is constituted by a plurality of social relations, even if such relations are oriented towards our conditions of existence and thus the need to produce' (Bruff 2009, 346).

The case for a foundational materialism: going beyond historical materialist IPE in order to strengthen it

“…This rejection of the thought/action dichotomypresent in much of Gramsci's writings but significantly more prominent elsewhere in the social sciences and humanities -enables us to appreciate that the ideas we hold are inextricably linked to our conditions of existence. That is, there are inevitable asymmetries, repetitions and tendencies within our thoughts about the world towards our need for food, water, shelter and so on (Bruff 2009(Bruff , 2010. As a result, there is a clear directedness to the evolution of the societies in which we live (past, present or future) -there cannot be full contingency because of the foundations upon which human existence is built.…”

Revisiting the debate on open Marxist perspectives

“…On this basis a further criticism is derived (Bruff 2009a(Bruff , 2009bBieler at al. 2010) that OM rejects transhistorical qualities of human existence.…”

“…10 Susen (2012: 311) similarly charges Holloway’s (2010) approach of engaging with all possible-isms as outlined above. On this basis, a further criticism is derived (Bieler et al, 2010; Bruff, 2009a, 2009b) that OM rejects transhistorical qualities of human existence. This point seems particularly galling from a Marxist historical materialism, especially given the preference of the critics to quote from The German Ideology (Marx and Engels, 1998 [1845]: 2), which emphasises that ‘whenever we speak, therefore, of production, we always have in mind production at a certain stage of social development, or production of social individuals’.…”

“… 2. A particularly egregious example of the interaction between open Marxist (OM) and neo-Gramscian authors can be found in the exchange between Bonefeld (2009) and Bruff (2009a, 2009b) in The British Journal of Politics and International Relations 11: 3. Indeed, this is an unproductive exchange, with little charity or solidarity from either author. …”

Acorns and fruit: From totalization to periodization in the critique of capitalism

“…The citation follows the convention of the International Gramsci Society by referring to the notebook number (Q) and section ( §) to enable the reader to trace the specific collocation of notes (see www.internationalgramscisociety.org). See Bruff (2009b) for an immediate reply on this debate. 3 Although where this leaves the very fetishization of ideas-for example, through a consideration of World Bank reports as 'indicative of ideology at work' within the canon of Open Marxism-is unclear; see Charnock (2008: 137;.…”