Assessing Misaligned Counterinsurgency Practice in Niger and Nigeria

Abstract

While representing a major military threat in Niger and Nigeria, the two branches of the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP-Liptako Gourma and ISWAP-Lake Chad) have increasingly sought to win popular support (distinguishing themselves from other groups in the region, especially Boko Haram). Yet, despite some improvements in the recent past, both Niger's and Nigeria's different counterinsurgency practices have not been sufficiently adapted to (and therefore remain strategically misaligned vis-á-vis) ISWAP's more population-centric approach. Strategic rethinking and realignment of the still predominantly enemy-centric approaches of both states are essential so that ISWAP strategy can be countered in the long term.

The Protracted Survival of Boko Haram From a Revolutionary Warfare Perspective

“…Particularly, he states that Shekau, during his rule of the caliphate, "sowed corruption and ruined the cultivation and animals", referring to the incompetent control and lack of governance during this time (Stoddard, 2019: 311). What is more, researchers have pointed out that, unlike JAS with its approach of polarizing people into submission, ISWAP tends to actually help populations under their control by offering protection from JAS or state COIN forces (Berlingozzi, 2020). In fact, ever since the two factions split, there has been infighting between them not only ideologically but also militarily.…”

“…The split between ISWAP and JAS can also be noticed in the ways they sustain their insurgencies. ISWAP, in order to remain less intrusive and look more favourable, refrained from stealing goods and animals and restricting the movement of herders, instead choosing to collect taxes from the people (Berlingozzi, 2020). JAS, on the other hand, chooses to loot and pillage villages for resources in addition to their infamous tactics of kidnapping for ransom, which is, unsurprisingly, not perceived well by locals (Berlingozzi, 2020).…”

“…ISWAP, in order to remain less intrusive and look more favourable, refrained from stealing goods and animals and restricting the movement of herders, instead choosing to collect taxes from the people (Berlingozzi, 2020). JAS, on the other hand, chooses to loot and pillage villages for resources in addition to their infamous tactics of kidnapping for ransom, which is, unsurprisingly, not perceived well by locals (Berlingozzi, 2020). Nevertheless, what is initially perceived cannot always be taken as a fact, and the same stands for ISWAP's tax collection methods.…”

“…However, continuing the trend of a more populationcentric approach, ISWAP does not restrict Muslim women as much as JAS does. Instead of being used for satisfying the needs of fighters or doing hard labour, women are often used as recruiters, moving freely within ISWAP-controlled territory and venturing into internally displaced person (IDP) camps to gather recruits (Berlingozzi, 2020). Additionally, in more rural areas, women often benefit from the insurgency through the education of children, providing logistical support by cooking or through other supporting tasks (Berlingozzi, 2020).…”

The End of the Sahelian Exception: Al-Qaeda and Islamic State Clash in Central Mali

“…Fragmentation and fluidity tend to characterise the Sahelian jihadist landscape, both at the level of leadership and of members and supporters. For example, ISGS officially joined ISWAP (Islamic State West Africa Province) in March 2019, but the former has maintained its operative and strategic autonomy (seeBerlingozzi and Stoddard 2020). For these reasons, we prefer to employ the term "coalition" along with that of "group" when talking about the insurgent actors in Mali and the Sahel.…”