Assessing Professional Know-How

Abstract

CHRISTOPHER WINCHThis article considers how professional knowledge should be assessed. It is maintained that the assessment of professional know-how raises distinctive issues from the assessment of know-how more generally. Intellectualist arguments which suggest that someone's giving an account of how to F should suffice for attributing to them knowledge of how to F are set out. The arguments fail to show that there is no necessary distinction between two kinds of know-how, namely the ability to F and knowing that w is a way to F, such that the latter is more fundamental. The consequences of this failure for our understanding of professional assessment are then considered. The issue of the assessment of tacit knowledge is then addressed. It is concluded that there is no context-dependent codifiable or articulable propositional knowledge of how to F which could be substituted for being able to F and that therefore tacit knowledge can only be assessed in performance. The parallel with Gettier cases is reviewed and it is concluded that the provenance of accounts of and justifications for the attribution of know-how are not matters of indifference to its assessment. Finally, the question of evaluability or what Ryle would have called the applicability of intelligence epithets is discussed in relation to its relevance to our procedures for assessing practical knowledge. Once again, it is concluded that excellent performance is necessary to attribute excellence in know-how. However, the ability to give an account of how and why an agent would do something in hypothetical circumstances is also very important for the assessment of professional knowledge.

Learning outcomes: The long goodbye: Vocational qualifications in the 21st century

“…12 The NVQ approach to occupational knowledge, treating it as implicitly manifested in workplace practice, is not viable. Assessors can only gauge underpinning and/or theoretical knowledge in an indirect and piecemeal fashion, leaving the danger of large gaps in professional knowledge that would only come to light outside the assessment context (Prais, 1991;Winch, 2016). This problem was recognised with the introduction of modern apprenticeships (MA) at level 3 from 1994 onwards, containing an NVQ for the practical elements, a technical certificate for the theoretical element and a functional skills element for basic literacy and numeracy.…”

“…We should also distinguish between transversal abilities in the sense just described and transferable abilities applicable across a range of activities (Winch, 2015(Winch, , 2016. In general, transversal abilities have limited transferability.…”

Professionalism in vocational education: international perspectives

“…QCT standard 1.1 is the only one of the proposed Queensland standards which explicitly requires theoretical knowledge, and then only in relation to the underpinning of 'effective practice' in teaching and assessment. In the UK, whilst Professional Standards 8 & 9 require practitioners to 'maintain and update your knowledge of educational research to develop evidence based practice' and 'apply theoretical understanding of effective practice in teaching, learning and assessment drawing on research and other evidence' these criteria too imply that theoretical underpinnings of teaching as practice are all that is necessary for teachers to understand, a positon which may be argued to privilege 'knowing how' over 'knowing that' (Winch, 2015, after Ryle, 1949 , as well as reflecting a failure to acknowledge the symbiotic relationship between the two types of knowledge .…”

Knowing ‘Wh’ and Knowing How: Constructing Professional Curricula and Integrating Epistemic Fields

“…We often need to know, not merely that A knows when to make use of relevant educational research in their classroom work, but that A has a good understanding of the conditions under which it is appropriate to do so, and can also acquaint himself with those conditions. Professional know‐how, which involves applying both theoretical and specific knowledge to complex and changing operational conditions, demands assessment in both practical and propositional modes, as well as acquaintance with appropriate circumstances, instruments, etc (see also Winch, ).…”

“…We need to take account of the tacit element in know‐how and accept that no account can be complete. See Gascoigne and Thornton () for a claim to the articulability of tacit knowledge and Winch () for a critique. See Von Krogh, G, Ichijo, K. and Nonaka, I.…”