Assessing the Causal Structure of Function.

Abstract

Theories typically emphasize affordances or intentions as the primary determinant of an object's perceived function. The HIPE theory assumes that people integrate both into causal models that produce functional attributions. In these models, an object's physical structure and an agent's action specify an affordance jointly, constituting the immediate causes of a perceived function. The object's design history and an agent's goal in using it constitute distant causes. When specified fully, the immediate causes are sufficient for determining the perceived function--distant causes have no effect (the causal proximity principle). When the immediate causes are ambiguous or unknown, distant causes produce inferences about the immediate causes, thereby affecting functional attributions indirectly (the causal updating principle). Seven experiments supported HIPE's predictions.

Theory-based categorization under speeded conditions

“…The influence of theory use was demonstrated when participants weighted function-relevant features more heavily than function-irrelevant features (their actions appeared to conform to a rule such as: "If X has Y's function-relevant features, then X is a Y"). Such a rule has been posited to operate across the entire domain of artifacts (see, e.g., Bloom, 1996;Chaigneau, Barsalou, & Sloman, 2004) and thus could have influenced feature weighting relatively automatically. Similarly, Palmeri and Blalock (2000) asked participants to generate explicit classification rules before being tested with new drawings (in contrast to Smith & Sloman, 1994, in which participants presumably generated rules while attempting to perform the categorization).…”

Classification as diagnostic reasoning

“…For example, although underlying causal properties might be important for complex artifacts (e.g., automobiles, computers), simple artifacts like pencils and wastepaper baskets appear to be defined more in terms of their perceptual and/ or functional properties (Chaigneau, Barsalou, & Sloman, 2004;Malt, 1994;Malt & Johnson, 1992cf. Bloom, 1998;Matan & Carey, 2001;Rips, 1989).…”

The Pragmatics of Explanation

“…When the prior experiences instead capture the same events within a completed system, the system becomes an important aspect of the internal model and the subsequent explanations reflect that structure. The idea that these sorts of models underlie explanation is not new: Keil (2006) and Chaigneau, Barsalou, and Sloman (2004) have recently proposed similar ideas. However, by using the framework provided by the pragmatic theory, we can be more specific as to when particular information is incorporated and how it shapes the explanatory model that is constructed.…”

“…Glymour, 1998) and functional explanations (e.g. Chaigneau, Barsalou, & Sloman, 2004;Lombrozo & Carey, 2006) are warranted. In the current study, we extend this work by asking participants to provide an explanation for an explanandum when either a causal or functional explanation is licensed.…”

“…According to this view, function is not what anachronistically explains the presence of something but what results from a series of items fulfilling their capacities within a larger causal structure. Chaigneau, Barsalou, and Sloman (2004) tested the relative contributions of the history and causal structure to an appreciation of function in a series of experiments. Within the framework of their HIPE theory, they posited that an item would be identified with a particular function either by having been made to fulfill that function, a historical account in line with Wright (1973), or by having an appropriate causal structure for the function, as suggested by Cummins (1975).…”