Assessing the Efficacy of Structural Merger Remedies: Choosing between Theories of Harm?

Davies, Stephen; Olczak, Matthew

doi:10.2139/ssrn.1259853

Cited by 4 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 19 publications

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“…58 The Commission may even tolerate likely coordinated effects if by doing this, it dissipates graver concerns of pre-existing unilateral effects. 59 In some industries, oligopolists may not merge for long periods of time or do it only cyclically, retarding excessively the Commission's intervention. 60 There is also a risk that negotiated remedies to coordinated effects prove inadequate where the underlying assessment of competition is flawed.…”

Section: A Ec Merger Controlmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Anti-Collusion Toolkit: Limits of a Policy that Combats the Facilitation of Collusion

Mezzanotte

2011

European Law Journal

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This paper identifies key obstacles of law enforcement that may frustrate a policy that fights the facilitation of collusion. It outlines remedial actions against features that facilitate collusion and examines to what extent authorities--such as Directorate General (DG) for Competition, National Competition Authorities and regulators--have the powers and ability to take these actions. The analysis covers a number of legal tools including the theory of harm of coordinated effects in European merger control, Articles 101 and 102 Treaty for the Functioning of the European Union, stricter national laws and regulation. I conclude that DG Competition has little powers to act, except for merger control. Although NCAs and regulators may enjoy broader powers, tough challenges lie ahead in terms of the exercise of discretion, error and effectiveness of remedial actions.

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Section: A Ec Merger Controlmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Anti-Collusion Toolkit: Limits of a Policy that Combats the Facilitation of Collusion

Mezzanotte

2011

European Law Journal

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“…As Davies (2010) argues, "Allowing the merger [between Nestle and Perrier] without remedy would have been preferable", since remedies have created a more symmetric market structure which facilitates tacit collusion. Blanc and Shelanski see a "bias towards wide structural remedies" 7 , at least in the telecommunications industry and provide examples where these have not worked out as intended.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Duso et al (2011) and Kwoka and Green…eld (2013) …nd that in comparison with a rigorous denial, remedies may not be well-suited to countervail anticompetitive e¤ects arising from a merger. Davies (2010) tackles the adequacy of remedies especially in case the pre-merger market structure could already give rise to competitive concerns. Also behavioral remedies often fail to eliminate competitive concerns, as Duso et al (2011) and Kwoka and Moss (2011) …nd.…”

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confidence: 99%

Remedies vs. Extreme Options in Merger Control

Dertwinkel-Kalt

Wey

2014

SSRN Journal

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may AbstractWe investigate how remedies in merger control a¤ect information acquisition by an antitrust agency. We identify conditions under which an "extreme options" regime which does not allow for remedies improves information acquisition by the agency which increases consumer surplus. The legislator ("principal") and the agency share the same objective function with the only exception that the latter must bear information costs. When remedies are not feasible, then the agency's incentive to acquire information is relatively large as a false decision tends to have large adverse e¤ects. When remedies are feasible, the intermediate option does not involve such risks, so that incentives to acquire information decreases. However, our results depend crucially on the institutional environment. In the case of an adversial system, information acquisition incentives are not per se lower if remedies are feasible.We thank Lars Sorgard and Deszö Szalay for their helpful comments.

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Determinants of the Success of Remedy Offers: Evidence from European Community Mergers

Ormosi

2009

SSRN Journal

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Assessing the Efficacy of Structural Merger Remedies: Choosing between Theories of Harm?

Cited by 4 publications

References 19 publications

The Anti-Collusion Toolkit: Limits of a Policy that Combats the Facilitation of Collusion

The Anti-Collusion Toolkit: Limits of a Policy that Combats the Facilitation of Collusion

Remedies vs. Extreme Options in Merger Control

Determinants of the Success of Remedy Offers: Evidence from European Community Mergers

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