Assessing the New Constitutionalism

Hilbink, Lisa

doi:10.5129/001041508x12911362382878

Cited by 48 publications

(15 citation statements)

References 20 publications

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“…Courts are often far from insulated from majoritarian politics or popular involvement because legislatures are involved in judicial appointments, and there is continuing dialogue between institutions, and in some cases individuals, on constitutional issues. Judicial empowerment is thus not an institutional zero‐sum game; nor are judges always agents of elites (Hilbink 2008, 228–237).…”

Section: What the Literature Has To Contributementioning

confidence: 99%

A Tale of Two Courts: The Judicialization of Electoral Politics in Asia

Dressel¹,

Mietzner²

2012

Governance

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This article examines the judicialization of electoral politics in Asia, an important but understudied trend, as demonstrated in Thailand and Indonesia. Though the constitutional courts in both have similar histories and institutional arrangements, their electoral interventions vary radically. We argue that the diffusion or concentration of power among post‐transition elites determines whether the effect of judicial activism will be to shore up or undermine electoral governance. Where power is diffused, as in Indonesia, political actors, less able to impose their own will on the judiciary, seem to prefer a credible referee, which fosters electoral competition. Where power is concentrated, as in Thailand, elites have both the motive and the means to turn judicial activism to antidemocratic ends. By focusing on the ends, rather than the means, of judicial activism, this account goes beyond personalities and institutional design to enhance understanding of the role of the courts in transitional democracies.

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Section: What the Literature Has To Contributementioning

confidence: 99%

A Tale of Two Courts: The Judicialization of Electoral Politics in Asia

Dressel¹,

Mietzner²

2012

Governance

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“…Most scholars agree that the introduction of constitutional courts (or other mechanisms of judicial review) generally occurs during political transitions or periods of major political and economic change (Ginsburg 2003;HirschI 2004;Horowitz 2006;Hilbink 2006). In Ginsburg's view-which is shared by Horowitz-s-heightened political uncertainty tends to convince worried political elites that an independent court overseeing the constitutionality of laws and policies could offer them "protection against a day when their adversaries may act against them" (Horowitz 2006, 126).…”

Section: Political Conflicts Before 2003: Mass Mobilization and Militmentioning

confidence: 99%

Political Conflict Resolution and Democratic Consolidation in Indonesia: The Role of the Constitutional Court

Mietzner¹

2010

Journal of East Asian Studies

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This article argues that Indonesia's Constitutional Court has played a significant role in that country's transformation from a violence-prone polity into Southeast Asia's most stable democracy. The Court has advanced institutional conflict resolution mechanisms and expanded democratic rights—two achievements identified by Linz and Stepan as major indicators of a consolidating democracy. Building on models developed by Ginsburg and Horowitz, my analysis also illustrates why the Court has been able to defend its autonomy and become an agent of democratization. While sharing Ginsburg's emphasis on high levels of power diffusion as a key reason for the Court's success, this article moves beyond such an approach. Most importantly, it suggests that the judges' “judicial activism”—as expressed in a number of controversial but popular decision—increased Indonesian society's support for the Court to such an extent that is has now become largely invulnerable to attempts of external intervention.

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“…While the debate has often been empirically weak, even normatively charged, it does highlight the complex interplay between judicial empowerment and aspects of governance, such as the widely used dimensions of "good" governance like rule of law, accountability, predictability and representation (see Hilbink 2008;Gibler and Randazzo 2011). For instance, at the regime level it is relatively easy to view judicial actors and processes acting in support of the rule of law as part of a general process of legalisation, in fact their relationship to political accountability and representation is often far more complex.…”

Section: Judicialisation and Governancementioning

confidence: 99%

Governance, Courts and Politics in Asia

Dressel¹

2014

Journal of Contemporary Asia

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Assessing the New Constitutionalism

Cited by 48 publications

References 20 publications

A Tale of Two Courts: The Judicialization of Electoral Politics in Asia

A Tale of Two Courts: The Judicialization of Electoral Politics in Asia

Political Conflict Resolution and Democratic Consolidation in Indonesia: The Role of the Constitutional Court

Governance, Courts and Politics in Asia

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