Assessment of Cryptographic Approaches for Quantum-Resistant Galileo OSNMA

Abstract

As time goes on, quantum computing has become more of a reality, bringing several cybersecurity challenges. Modern cryptography is based on the computational complexity of specific mathematical problems; however, as new quantum-based computers are developed, classical methods might not be sufficient to secure communications. In this paper, we analyze the state of the Galileo open service navigation message authentication (OSNMA) to overcome these new threats. This analysis and its assessment have been performed using OSNMA documentation, where we have reviewed the available post-quantum cryptography (PQC) algorithms competing in the National Institute of Standards and Technology standardization process and assessed the possibility of OSNMA implementation in the Galileo service. The main barrier to adopting PQC approaches is the size of both the signature and the key. This analysis shows that OSNMA is not yet capable of facing quantum threats and that significant changes are required. This work concludes by assessing different transitory countermeasures that can be implemented to sustain the system's integrity in the short term.