Asset Complementarity, Resource Shocks, and the Political Economy of Property Rights

Abstract

Collaboration between two groups that may invest their resources in a common productive activity has the potential to lead to conflict over the output of that activity. This article examines the stakes of such conflict as well as the willingness for parties to subject themselves to a third-party arbiter. The model highlights three determinants of conflict and of investment in credibility-enhancing institutions: the value of the output, the relative endowments of the parties, and the mutual benefits of collaboration. In particular, the analysis shows that complementarity between the groups’ resources lowers the stakes of political conflict and increases the incentives to commit. The model thus suggests a new mechanism through which we can understand the frequency of conflict and the poor institutions associated in countries with mineral resources. The model’s predictions also help us to understand how Mauritius avoided the resource curse and was able to develop sustainable economic growth.

Political Implications of Natural Resources Conflict in Sudan

“…Moreover, the literature focusing on the relationship between fragility situation, resource governance and conflict, illustrate the case of current study. Nevertheless, the points argued by Silve (2012); Ushie (2013) and Collier and Venables (2010) provide a more interesting and promising account, and are in agreement with the researcher. Yet, in all countries which witnessed resource conflict including Sudan, it appears that natural resources issue directly hinder the development of political stability due to political and armed struggle between governments, regional armed or organized groups over control and benefit of mineral resources and their wealth.…”

“…The good examples of those states are countries like Serra Leone, Liberia, Sudan and Indonesia. Moreover, Silve (2012) approves that a fragile state is a country which witnesses political competition over resource revenue; the failure in developing of property right institutions, resource management capacity and sharing of revenue cause political competition among individuals, groups in mineral -rich countries. In an interesting way Collier and Venables (2010) argue that weak governance occurs when a discovered mineral resource has a negative impact on governance and institutions performance, due to sever of political corruption in mineral sector, lack of accountability and rule of law.…”

The Oil Resource Wealth: Accounting Political Relations in Sudan

“…Thus, it experiences long civil wars, and countries like Serra Leone, Liberia, Sudan, and Indonesia are well examples. Moreover, Silve (2018) States that failed state is a country which witnessing political competition over resource revenues, however, failed to develop property right institutions, resource management capacity and sharing of revenues generated of proceeded resource because of political competition among individuals groups in mineral -rich countries. In Interesting way Collier and Venables (2010:8) argue that "weak governance occurs when a discovered resource has a negative impact on governance and institutions performance, due to corruption, lack of accountability and participation."…”

Die Pandemie offenbart die Defizite des transnationalen Menschenrechtsschutzes: Ein Plädoyer für eine Konfliktperspektive auf globale Lieferketten

“…Konflikte und Konfliktregionen dienen auch als Ausgangspunkt für die Untersuchung sozio-ökonomischer Verhältnisse, die teilweise als Ursache oder relevante Dimension des Konflikts mit berücksichtigt werden (vgl. etwa Silve 2018 ). 1 Die staatliche Kapazität steht hierbei meist im Vordergrund (Silve 2018 :1511), weniger aber die transnationale Dimension wirtschaftlicher Verflechtung.…”

“…etwa Silve 2018 ). 1 Die staatliche Kapazität steht hierbei meist im Vordergrund (Silve 2018 :1511), weniger aber die transnationale Dimension wirtschaftlicher Verflechtung. Eine breitere Rezeption des Zusammenhangs zwischen globalen Lieferketten, ihrer politischen Gestaltung und gesellschaftlichen Konflikten findet bisher außerhalb der Friedens- und Konfliktforschung statt (vgl.…”