“…Longterm relational contracts (Masten & Crocker, 1985;Mulherin, 1986;Wiggins & Libecap, 1985), impartition policies (Barreyre, 1988), tapered and quasi-integration (Porter, 1980), joint ventures (Harrigan, 1988), franchising (John, 1984;Norton, 1988;Rubin, 1978), networks (Jarillo, 1988: Thorelli, 1986), quasi-firms (Eccles, 1981), hybrids (Borys & Jemison, 1989), and "vertical financial ownership" (Flaherty, 1981) are some of the "institutions of capitalism" (Williamson, 1985) which emerged in response to the inadequacies of "classical market contracting" (Macneil, 1980). The generalizable thesis of the transaction cost literature is that the particular institution (governance structure) chosen to implement the strategy of vertical integration mainly serves efficiency purposes (Bork, 1978;Williamson, 1985 (Simon, 1978 Contractual problems become acute when there are small numbers bargaining, a situation that occurs when transactions involve human, physical or site "asset specificity" (Spiller, 1985;Williamson, 1979 (Joskow, 1985a Goldberg & Erickson, 1987;Hennart 1988b;Klein, 1988;Palay, 1984;Teece, 1976), formal modeling (Kleindorfer & Knieps, 1982;Masten, 1982;Riordan & Williamson, 1985) and statistical testing (Anderson & Schmittlein, 1984;Armour & Teece, 1980;Caves & Bradburd, 1988;Heide & John, 1988;…”