Assistance to the poor in a federal system

Brown, Charles; Oates, Wallace E.

doi:10.1016/0047-2727(87)90035-1

Cited by 182 publications

(54 citation statements)

References 14 publications

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“…He concludes that recent studies using disaggregated data and sophisticated econometric techniques "show positive and significant effects of welfare on residential location and geographic mobility" Brown and Oates (1987). come to this same conclusion.…”

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confidence: 80%

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Voting on welfare reform Stemming migration, assisting the needy, or promoting economic growth?

Coates

2000

Econ Gov

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This paper examines the influences on voting by members of the House of Representatives on the Carter Administration's welfare reform legislation. The analysis finds some support for the hypothesis that voting by national legislators responded to the potential mobility of welfare recipients from low to high benefit states. Defining the public interest as promoting economic growth and the special interest as increasing redistribution, the results also provide evidence in support of the Stigler hypothesis that politically secure legislators are better able to vote the public, as opposed to the special, interest.

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confidence: 80%

“…Key to the Brown and Oates analysis is the assumption that the nonpoor derive utility from the income of the poor 3 . Brown and Oates (1987) summarize the relationship of welfare to mobility with two questions. First, do benefit differentials induce migration from low to high benefit jurisdictions?…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Voting on welfare reform Stemming migration, assisting the needy, or promoting economic growth?

Coates

2000

Econ Gov

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“…As for which level of government should provide redistribution, despite Pauly's (1973) arguments supporting local governments as the ones to be in charge of this task -because of geographically delimited altruism -several other authors show concerns about migration ruining local programs (Oates, 1999;Brown and Oates, 1985;Musgrave, 1971) and defend redistribution to be carried on by central governments. In fact, in most countries, a major part of the redistribution is carried on by the central governments through intergovernmental grants.…”

Section: Ijse 405mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The literature on fiscal federalism usually states that income should be redistributed by the central government (Oates, 1999;Brown and Oates, 1985;Musgrave, 1971). In contrast, Pauly (1973) questions centralized redistribution policies.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Altruism and participation costs in local redistribution

Terra

Mattos

2013

International Journal of Social Economics

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2015),"Does altruism matter on online group buying? Perspectives from egotistic and altruistic motivation", Information Technology & People, Vol. 28 Iss 3 pp. 677-698 http://dx.If you would like to write for this, or any other Emerald publication, then please use our Emerald for Authors service information about how to choose which publication to write for and submission guidelines are available for all. Please visit www.emeraldinsight.com/authors for more information. About Emerald www.emeraldinsight.comEmerald is a global publisher linking research and practice to the benefit of society. The company manages a portfolio of more than 290 journals and over 2,350 books and book series volumes, as well as providing an extensive range of online products and additional customer resources and services.Emerald is both COUNTER 4 and TRANSFER compliant. The organization is a partner of the Committee on Publication Ethics (COPE) and also works with Portico and the LOCKSS initiative for digital archive preservation. AbstractPurpose -The purpose of this paper is to investigate the role played by the geographic distance between the poor and non-poor in the local demand for income redistribution and, in particular, to provide an empirical test of the geographically limited altruism model proposed by Pauly, incorporating the possibility of participation costs associated with the provision of transfers. Design/methodology/approach -First, the authors motivate the discussion by allowing for an "iceberg cost" as participation for the poor individuals in Pauly's original model. Next, using data from the 2000 Brazilian Census and a panel based on the National Household Sample Survey (PNAD) from 2001 to 2007, the authors estimate the effect of the proximity between poor and non-poor on the demand for redistribution. Findings -All of the authors' distance-related explanatory variables indicate that an increased proximity between poor and non-poor is associated with better targeting of the programs (demand for redistribution). For instance, a one-hour increase in the time spent commuting by the poor reduces the targeting by 3.158 percentage points. This result is similar to that of Ashworth et al., but is definitely not due to the program leakages. To empirically disentangle participation costs and spatially restricted altruism effects, an additional test is conducted using unique panel data based on the 2004 and 2006 PNAD, which assess the number of benefits and the average benefit value received by beneficiaries. The estimates suggest that both cost and altruism play important roles in the demand for redistribution and might reduce targeting in Brazil. Lastly, the results indicate that "size matters"; i.e. the budget for redistribution has a positive impact on targeting. Practical implications -Our results suggest that a totally centralized supply of transfers may be more inefficient than local redistribution in terms of targeting, either due to higher participation costs or because of the eventual greater geographical distance ...

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“…Revenue controls dampen distortive competition for scarce capital and prevent tax exporting that shifts the burden to nonresidents.' Spending regulations prevent local authorities from neglecting services that attract welfare recipients or produce benefit spillovers while spending too much on services that attract firms or wealthy taxpayers (Brown and Oates 1987;Taylor 1992).…”

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confidence: 99%

Central Regulation of Local Authorities

Carlsen

1998

Public Finance Review

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Decentralized provision of services allows communities to adapt to local variations in preferences. However, surveys show that central regulation of local sector revenue, spending, and borrowing decisions is pervasive. This article argues that one rationale for central regulations is to prevent local authorities from distorting allocation decisions in order to drive up intergovernmental grants. By limiting the local sector's discretion to act strategically, regulations give the government leeway in setting grants.Fiscal policy making at the local level involves three distinct allocation decisions: setting the mix between private and local public spending, setting the mix between different spending categories, and determining the intertemporal distribution of spending. These will be referred to as the revenue, spending, and borrowing decisions, respectively.According to the &dquo;classical&dquo; theory of fiscal federalism, subcentral authorities have an important part to play in the allocation function of government because decentralized provision of services allows communities to adapt to variations in circumstances and taste (Oates 1972;King 1984). When communities have different preferences for the size, composition, and intertemporal distribution of public spending, there is a strong case for decentralizing revenue, spending, and borrowing decisions to local authorities.However, surveys of central-local relations in Western Europe show that, for all three aspects of local fiscal policy, central regulations are pervasive.' The center controls local revenues by setting intergov-

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Assistance to the poor in a federal system

Cited by 182 publications

References 14 publications

Voting on welfare reform Stemming migration, assisting the needy, or promoting economic growth?

Voting on welfare reform Stemming migration, assisting the needy, or promoting economic growth?

Altruism and participation costs in local redistribution

Central Regulation of Local Authorities

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