Assisted Suicide, the Supreme Court, and the Constitutive Function of the Law

Kaveny, M. Cathleen

doi:10.2307/3527801

Cited by 10 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 3 publications

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“…Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes of personhood were they formed under compulsion of the State. 24…”

Section: Killing and Letting Diementioning

confidence: 99%

“…It is simply not cited. 26 Yet for purposes of this paper, the Brief serves to reveal the two key philosophical assumptions which have thus far justified events like Kevorkian, physician advocacy of suicide, and euthanasia in Oregon and the Netherlands. That is, physician-assisted suicide and euthanasia require, on the one hand, the déniai of a distinction between killing and letting die, and on the other, the assertion of unbridled patient autonomy.…”

Section: Killing and Letting Diementioning

confidence: 99%

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Physicians Ought Not Kill

Healy¹

2001

Linacre Q

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“…Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes of personhood were they formed under compulsion of the State. 24…”

Section: Killing and Letting Diementioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Killing and Letting Diementioning

confidence: 99%

Physicians Ought Not Kill

Healy¹

2001

Linacre Q

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Death Revisited: Rethinking Death and the Dead Donor Rule

Iltis

Cherry

2010

Journal of Medicine and Philosophy

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Traditionally, people were recognized as being dead using cardio-respiratory criteria: individuals who had permanently stopped breathing and whose heart had permanently stopped beating were dead. Technological developments in the middle of the twentieth century and the advent of the intensive care unit made it possible to sustain cardio-respiratory and other functions in patients with severe brain injury who previously would have lost such functions permanently shortly after sustaining a brain injury. What could and should physicians caring for such patients do? Significant advances in human organ transplantation also played direct and indirect roles in discussions regarding the care of such patients. Because successful transplantation requires that organs be removed from cadavers shortly after death to avoid organ damage due to loss of oxygen, there has been keen interest in knowing precisely when people are dead so that organs could be removed. Criteria for declaring death using neurological criteria developed, and today a whole brain definition of death is widely used and recognized by all 50 states in the United States as an acceptable way to determine death. We explore the ongoing debate over definitions of death, particularly over brain death or death determined using neurological criteria, and the relationship between definitions of death and organ transplantation.

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How the Distinction between "Irreversible" and "Permanent" Illuminates Circulatory-Respiratory Death Determination

Bernat

2010

Journal of Medicine and Philosophy

112

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The distinction between the "permanent" (will not reverse) and "irreversible" (cannot reverse) cessation of functions is critical to understand the meaning of a determination of death using circulatory-respiratory tests. Physicians determining death test only for the permanent cessation of circulation and respiration because they know that irreversible cessation follows rapidly and inevitably once circulation no longer will restore itself spontaneously and will not be restored medically. Although most statutes of death stipulate irreversible cessation of circulatory and respiratory functions, the accepted medical standard is their permanent cessation because permanence is a perfect surrogate indicator for irreversibility, and using it permits a more timely declaration. Therefore, patients properly declared dead in donation after circulatory death (DCD) protocols satisfy the requirements of death statutes and do not violate the dead donor rule. The acronym DCD should represent organ "donation after circulatory death" to clarify that the death standard is the permanent cessation of circulation, not heartbeat. Heart donation in DCD does not retroactively negate the donor's death determination because circulation has ceased permanently.

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Assisted Suicide, the Supreme Court, and the Constitutive Function of the Law

Cited by 10 publications

References 3 publications

Physicians Ought Not Kill

Physicians Ought Not Kill

Death Revisited: Rethinking Death and the Dead Donor Rule

How the Distinction between "Irreversible" and "Permanent" Illuminates Circulatory-Respiratory Death Determination

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