Associative concept learning in animals

Abstract

Nonhuman animals show evidence for three types of concept learning: perceptual or similarity-based in which objects/stimuli are categorized based on physical similarity; relational in which one object/stimulus is categorized relative to another (e.g., same/different); and associative in which arbitrary stimuli become interchangeable with one another by virtue of a common association with another stimulus, outcome, or response. In this article, we focus on various methods for establishing associative concepts in nonhuman animals and evaluate data documenting the development of associative classes of stimuli. We also examine the nature of the common within-class representation of samples that have been associated with the same reinforced comparison response (i.e., many-to-one matching) by describing manipulations for distinguishing possible representations. Associative concepts provide one foundation for human language such that spoken and written words and the objects they represent become members of a class of interchangeable stimuli. The mechanisms of associative concept learning and the behavioral flexibility it allows, however, are also evident in the adaptive behaviors of animals lacking language.

Stimuli with identical contextual functions taught independently become functionally equivalent

“…As explained above, stimulus-stimulus relations are not involved. Other types of associative processes described consist of stimulus-reinforcer associations (e.g., Rescorla, 1992;Zentall, Wasserman, & Urcuioli, 2014). Specific stimulusoutcome relations cannot explain class formation with the X and Y stimuli either.…”

Emergence of visual-visual conditional discriminations

“…Evidence is also emerging that the defining features of stimulus equivalence (Sidman & Tailby, 1982) may be observed in nonhuman animals (for reviews, see LionelloDeNolf, 2009;Zentall et al, 2014), suggesting that human verbal behavior is unlikely to be a necessary prerequisite. But even if not necessary, it seems likely that the verbal behavior of human participants can at least facilitate accurate performance on equivalence tests.…”

Two perils of binary categorization: Why the study of concepts can’t afford true/false testing

“…When subjects exceed chance levels of performance, they are alleged to have learned "the concept." Critics are quick to point out that although subjects have learned something, confounds may explain performance more simply (Katz et al, 2007;Wright and Lickteig, 2010;Zentall et al, 2014). Despite a growing literature on both sides, supporters of "concept learning in animals" seem no closer to persuading the skeptics, while skeptics are no closer to persuading proponents.…”