Associative Political Obligations

Simmons, A. John

doi:10.1086/233617

Cited by 147 publications

(57 citation statements)

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“…(Dagger, 2000: 108) And as we saw, Simmons holds that "associative, communal, role, or institutional obligations require external justification to be morally binding." (Simmons, 1996: 273 n. 50) These criticisms clearly echo the normativist demand for a way of securing the distinction between genuine and spurious obligations. Horton questions the force of these objections.…”

Section: Normativism: Securing Genuine Obligationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The grammar of political obligation

Fossen

2013

Politics, Philosophy & Economics

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This essay presents a new way of conceptualizing the problem of political obligation. On the traditional 'normativist' framing of the issue, theorists' primary task is to secure the content and justification of political obligations, providing practically applicable moral knowledge. This paper develops an alternative, 'pragmatist' framing of the issue, by rehabilitating a frequently misunderstood essay by Hanna Pitkin and by recasting her argument in terms of the 'pragmatic turn' in recent philosophy, as articulated by Robert Brandom. From this perspective, the content and justification of political obligations cannot be determined in a way that is in principle separable from their application. This casts 'political obligation' not as a problem to be philosophically resolved, but as a political predicament that calls for a kind of practical engagement. The merit of this perspective is to draw our attention toward the conditions under which the problem appears as a lived predicament.

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Section: Normativism: Securing Genuine Obligationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The grammar of political obligation

Fossen

2013

Politics, Philosophy & Economics

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“…2 For a philosophical examination of possible justifications of such sanctions, see Hoskins (2014). 3 For criticism of the idea, see Simmons (1996). For a recent survey and assessment, see Van der Vossen (2011a, 2011b.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Invisible Punishment is Wrong – But Why? The Normative Basis of Criticism of Collateral Consequences of Criminal Conviction

Bennett

2017

Howard J Crime Justice

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This article is concerned with the way in which criminal justice systems cause harms that go well beyond the ‘headline’ punishment announced at sentencing. This is the phenomenon of ‘collateral consequences of criminal conviction’. This phenomenon has been widely criticised in recent criminological literature. However, the critics do not normally explore or defend the normative basis of their claims – as they need to if their arguments are to strike home against sceptics. I argue that the normative basis of the critics’ position should be seen as involving important normative claims about the responsibilities that societies have towards those who break the law. Some important strands of criticism, I claim, rest on the view that we have associative duties towards offenders (and their dependants and communities) as fellow participants in a collective democratic enterprise, duties that are violated when states impose, or allow, harms that go significantly beyond the sentence.

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“…What I believe are incompatible are decent societies and serious and systematic violations of rights. In these cases, the claim that holds that ''the most 12 For a meaningful critical reading of political obligation, see Simmons (1996). 13 When the most severe discrimination was exercised against African-Americans, and they were legally blocked from entering the same facilities that were constructed for whites.…”

Section: The Demands Of Political Obligationmentioning

confidence: 99%