Assumption of Risk, After All

Lying about Reservation Prices in Business Negotiation: A Qualified Defense

“…Assumption of risk is most commonly discussed in legal contexts, but its roots, many argue, are in morality (Dorfman 2014; Katz 1990; Feinberg 1988). In relevant respects, the ideas of consent and assumption of risk occupy a moral continuum.…”

“…Yet it still seems acceptable to lie to him. 5 A familiar concept explains the acceptability of some lying in poker and negotiation, as well as the acceptability of some tackling in American football, but does not rely on the concept of consent: the concept of assumption of risk (Dorfman 2014). 6 When a person knowingly and voluntary exposes herself to a risk, there is a presumption that she cannot reasonably complain when the risk materializes, even if she did not consent to the risk: she assumes the risk.…”

“…That suggests that beyond knowingly and voluntarily exposing oneself to risk, in order to assume a risk, it must be fair to assign that risk to the person who exposes herself to it. As Dorfman (2014) plausibly argues, considerations of fairness determine whether a person's intentional exposure to risk constitutes a voluntary assumption of risk. It is unfair, on one hand, to make Ida absorb the cost of her injury by treating her as assuming the risk when management could have feasibly prevented her injury by using a better safety device; if, on the other hand, management makes the device safe enough, Ida's action should be regarded as assuming the relevant risk.…”

“…Simons (2002) plausibly defends the concept of assumption of risk against skepticism, in my view, and also argues that attempts to replace it implicitly invoke it. Dorfman (2014) explains that much of the skepticism about assumption of risk arises from the perception that it is a politically regressive doctrine, aimed at shifting liability away from corporations and toward consumers and workers. Properly understood, Dorfman argues, assumption of risk rejects such a shift and is instead a progressive doctrine aimed at achieving a fair balance between the powerful and the less powerful.…”

Prolegómenos para una regulación interpersonal del riesgo

“…Por ejemplo, si bien es cierto que el alcance del riesgo puede ser determinable, la cantidad de personas sometidas a él puede ser tal que resulta económicamente menos gravoso que un representante de la sociedad (por ejemplo un organismo de carácter público) o estar sujetas al riesgo. Esto evidentemente niega contextos en los que las opciones de seguridad y los costes de tomar opciones más seguras no están al alcance de la persona promedio (un argumento similar en Dorfman, 2014). Segundo, parecen suponer que la significación del daño, a diferencia del riesgo, no dependería de la aversión a este, lo cual es infundado.…”