Asylum seeking and irregular migration

Djajić, Slobodan

doi:10.1016/j.irle.2014.06.002

Cited by 18 publications

(13 citation statements)

References 32 publications

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“… It is possible to introduce into the model the risk of getting caught in attempting to enter the host country and being repatriated by the authorities, as in Woodland and Yoshida () and Djajić () or getting caught and deported while working in the host country, as in Djajić and Vinogradova () and Vinogradova (). An increase in the risk of deportation would reduce a worker's net benefit of undocumented migration in a way that is very similar to that of an increase in K TF .…”

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confidence: 99%

Transit migration

Djajić

2017

Rev International Economics

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Unauthorized international migration to the advanced countries has become increasingly more costly and indirect. The hazardous land and sea routes that pass through one or more transit countries offer liquidity-constrained individuals an opportunity to economize on the pecuniary cost of migration as well as to work along the way to pay for the next leg of the journey. This paper analyzes the optimal behavior of transit migrants and examines its implications for the effectiveness of immigration control measures of the transit and final-destination countries in deterring unauthorized migration. Strengthening of border controls at the final destination is shown to increase the relative effectiveness of internal enforcement measures of the transit countries, while tougher internal enforcement in the transit countries increases the relative effectiveness of border controls at the final destination.

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confidence: 99%

Transit migration

Djajić

2017

Rev International Economics

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“…According to assumption A1, refugees gain utility by staying in any country that provides protection, but they have a strong preference to seek protection in their favoured country (assumption A3). We adhere to Djajic () in assuming that an expected income, which varies among different locations, determines the utility function. The variety of parameters determining the preferences is condensed to a coefficient ε that leads to higher expected income and thus a stronger preference for one country.…”

Section: The Provision Dilemma Of Humanitarian Protectionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…We have c i = w i ε + A 0 and c − i = w − i + A 0 , whereby w i and w − i are fixed and A 0 describes an asset the refugee holds (see Djajic, ). Introducing ε allows us to account for the heterogeneous preferences of refugees: ε determines the characteristics each refugee associates with one country, based on personal and structural reasons, network effect, language and culture.…”

Section: The Provision Dilemma Of Humanitarian Protectionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Humanitarian Protection as a European Public Good: The Strategic Role of States and Refugees

Lutz

Kaufmann

Stünzi

2020

J of Common Market Studies

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The surge of refugees arriving in Europe has accentuated the malfunctioning of the common European asylum system: the lack of coordination between nation states and failure in the common protection of refugees were the main outcomes of the so-called refugee crisis. This article builds on the literature on public goods and policy compliance in order to explain the failure of European countries to provide humanitarian protection to refugees. A sequential gametheoretical model serves to demonstrate the strategic interaction between states and refugees in European asylum policy. The analysis demonstrates that although both groups of actors benefit from a functioning European asylum system, they also have few incentives to contribute to the public good. States aim to reduce their individual refugee burden and refugees seek protection in their preferred destination country. The findings suggest that an effective provision of refugee protection requires both member states and refugees to contribute mutually to the public good.

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“…A similar type of an arrangement is currently being used to bring migrants from Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa to the West. I consider here a somewhat richer contractual framework, developed by Djajić andVinogradova (2013, 2014), which enables the migrant to optimally choose the duration of the repayment period. This type of arrangement is very common in the case of DB migration from South-East Asia to the advanced countries of East Asia (see Jones and Pardthaisong, 1999;Sobieszczyk, 2000;Djajić and Vinogradova, 2013).…”

Section: Debt-bonded Migration With Financial Supportmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…See Kwong () and Gao (). Financial support from the family network also plays an important role in influencing migration decisions of asylum seekers (see Djajić, ).…”

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Financial Support from the Family Network and Illegal Immigration

Djajić

2015

Rev International Economics

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Barriers to immigration of low-skilled workers from developing countries into the advanced countries prevent many potential migrants from leaving their countries of origin. With very low home-country wages in relation to the cost of undocumented migration, the opportunity to migrate often hinges on becoming indebted to a human smuggling organization or family and friends. This paper examines the conditions under which migration is optimal for an individual who lacks liquid assets, with a focus on alternative options for financing migration costs. One is by accumulating the required amount of savings out of source-country income, with or without financial support from the family or social network. The other is debt-bonded migration, which involves borrowing from a smuggling organization and paying o the loan while working in the host country. I find that greater financial support from the family network increases the attractiveness of debt-bonded relative to self-financed migration. Terms of use: Documents in© The Authors. All rights reserved. No part of this paper may be reproduced without the permission of the authors. AbstractBarriers to immigration of low-skilled workers from developing countries into the advanced countries prevent many potential migrants from leaving their countries of origin. With very low home-country wages in relation to the cost of undocumented migration, the opportunity to migrate often hinges on becoming indebted to a human smuggling organization or family and friends. This paper examines the conditions under which migration is optimal for an individual who lacks liquid assets, with a focus on alternative options for nancing migration costs. One is by accumulating the required amount of savings out of source-country income, with or without nancial support from the family or social network. The other is debt-bonded migration, which involves borrowing from a smuggling organization and paying o the loan while working in the host country. I nd that greater nancial support from the family network increases the attractiveness of debt-bonded relative to self-nanced migration.JEL Classication: F22, J61

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Asylum seeking and irregular migration

Cited by 18 publications

References 32 publications

Transit migration

Transit migration

Humanitarian Protection as a European Public Good: The Strategic Role of States and Refugees

Financial Support from the Family Network and Illegal Immigration

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