Asymmetric but uneven

Mastro, Oriana Skylar; Tarapore, Arzan

doi:10.4324/9781351001564-19

Cited by 6 publications

(7 citation statements)

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“…Of equal importance, the ability to supply such troops (especially in the western sector) would require supply lines stretching over thousands of kilometres. While some have argued that the absence of heavy industry and major population centres is an advantage for China, we argue that roads leading to western Tibet would be highly vulnerable to Indian missile and aircraft strikes (Mastro & Tarapore, 2020). In the event of open warfare, it is extremely unlikely that China would try to take territory beyond what is currently disputed.…”

Section: A Qualitative Assessment Of India’s Advantages Along the Bormentioning

confidence: 84%

“…Of note, India has also authorised the creation of a mountain strike corp (Pardesi, 2018, p. 118). Although this was suspended in 2018 (Mastro & Tarapore, 2020), given the clashes along the border in June 2020, it is highly likely it will be a top priority in the near future. Indian experience at mountain warfare may also help explain their tactical success during the 2017 Doklam border crisis, where they were able to prevail (no shots were fired) over the PLA (Mastro & Tarapore, 2020).…”

Section: A Qualitative Assessment Of India’s Advantages Along the Bormentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The estimated cost of such infrastructure is ₹21,040 crore (Singh, 2019), or approximately $2.86 billion. Apart from road projects, India has also reactivated 14 advance landing grounds, which are bare airbases that have not been in use since the 1962 war (Mastro & Tarapore, 2020). This is in comparison to the eight Chinese airbases (many of them dual use civilian facilities) that can be utilised to strike India (O’Donnell & Bolfrass, 2020).…”

Section: A Qualitative Assessment Of India’s Advantages Along the Bormentioning

confidence: 99%

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India–China and Their War-making Capacities

Colley¹,

Suhas

2021

Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs

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Much has been said about how China’s rapidly growing economy has led to increasing power disparity between India and China over the last two decades. China’s economic growth in this period has been spectacular, but it is not clear whether that gives a good sense of how effective its military capabilities are against India. In the context of the escalating Sino-Indian rivalry, this article asks the question: what is the nature of India’s power disparity vis-à-vis China? And does the existing power disparity between India and China give China a clear and uncontestable advantage? We argue that while there is significant asymmetry between India and China, the asymmetry is not as overwhelming when we consider certain facets of war-making capacity such as capital intensiveness of the military, military mobilisation, extractive capacity of the state and the institutional capacities to mobilise forces on a large scale, should the occasion demand. Moreover, India, with a more defensive posture against China, is in a better position to counter it because it mitigates the effects of power disparity. Therefore, we seek to understand the variation in asymmetries across different parameters of war-making capacity and force structure to better assess where the two countries may have advantages and disadvantages in the months and years to come. This article’s main contribution is to demonstrate through publicly available data the various levels of asymmetry between India and China. It also contributes to the security studies, rising powers and conflict literature.

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Section: A Qualitative Assessment Of India’s Advantages Along the Bormentioning

confidence: 84%

Section: A Qualitative Assessment Of India’s Advantages Along the Bormentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: A Qualitative Assessment Of India’s Advantages Along the Bormentioning

confidence: 99%

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India–China and Their War-making Capacities

Colley¹,

Suhas

2021

Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs

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“…China comprehends India’s anxieties and eagerness to resolve the border dispute but it has been reluctant to do so. China prefers to manage the border issue with India rather than resolving the border dispute (Fravel, 2020a; Mastro & Tarapore, 2020).…”

Section: Benefits Of Maintaining Status Quomentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Its principal emphasis is in the Pacific and South China Sea. India and the threat posed by India is and has been China’s secondary concern (Fravel, 2020a; Mastro & Tarapore, 2020). China’s ambition is to replace the US and become the most powerful country in the world by 2049.…”

Section: Demerits Of Maintaining Status Quo For China After April/may...mentioning

confidence: 99%

India–China Standoff in Ladakh and China’s Dilemma

Verma

2023

International Studies

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This article seeks to provide an answer to the question which has not been explored in the relevant academic scholarship: What are the merits and demerits of China restoring status quo ante or maintaining status quo along the disputed Line of Actual Control and why? This article argues that status quo renders China multiple geopolitical, geo-economic and geostrategic advantages: restoring its 1960s claim line and tactical and strategic gains along the LAC, security of Aksai Chin and inhibiting India’s rise. However, it also creates prospects for India–China conflict/war which will curtail (a victorious) China’s quest to become the pre-eminent global power. And a defeat/stalemate in conflict/war with India will impact China’s standing in global affairs, and repercussions for Communist Party of China’s regime stability and regime survival. On the other hand, restoring status quo ante also has tactical and strategic costs, and can also have domestic political costs for President Xi Jinping.

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India’s China strategy under Modi continuity in the management of an asymmetric rivalry

Pardesi

2021

Int Polit

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India’s strategy toward China under Modi needs to be understood as the approach of a rising power (in Asia) that has been in relative decline vis-à-vis China. Consequently, Modi’s India has adopted a mixed strategy toward its asymmetric rival China that includes accommodation / cooperation at the multilateral level (e.g., the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank), competition at the regional level (in the Indo-Pacific), rejection of China’s unilateral initiatives (such as the Belt and Road Initiative), and deterrence (along the Himalayas and in the Indian Ocean). This seemingly inchoate issue-based approach is function of material and ideational factors. In addition to safeguarding its sovereignty and territorial integrity, India aims to prevent Chinese hegemony in Asia while creating strategic space for itself as a great power in a multipolar Asia. However, India lacks a viable strategy to compete/catch-up with China economically, and therefore India’s overall response will be a constant challenge for its diplomacy.

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Asymmetric but uneven

Cited by 6 publications

References 0 publications

India–China and Their War-making Capacities

India–China and Their War-making Capacities

India–China Standoff in Ladakh and China’s Dilemma

India’s China strategy under Modi continuity in the management of an asymmetric rivalry

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