2000
DOI: 10.1002/(sici)1097-0266(200001)21:1<81::aid-smj62>3.0.co;2-r
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Asymmetric information and joint venture performance: theory and evidence for domestic and international joint ventures

Abstract: The increased number of perspectives on joint ventures (JVs) raises important issues for theory development on interfirm collaboration. In this paper, we bring together two key theoretical perspectives on joint ventures—the asymmetric information perspective and the indigestibility view. On a theoretical level, we focus on the relationship between these two different explanations of joint ventures. We also present new evidence on the firm valuation effects of JVs in domestic and international investment contex… Show more

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Cited by 221 publications
(163 citation statements)
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References 29 publications
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“…Differences in national culture, customer preferences, business practices, and institutional forces increase transaction costs when conducting investment abroad [12,19,20]. Furthermore, information asymmetry in foreign markets requires great efforts from executives to adjust to local market conditions, posting significant challenges in achieving strategic objectives [21,22]. Empirical studies demonstrate consistent evidence about the greater challenges in foreign investments, where foreign acquirers tend to pay more acquisition premiums [23] and suffer a higher failure rate [24], and in general, overseas investments receive much lower gains than their domestic equivalents [16,25].…”
Section: Challenges Of Fdismentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…Differences in national culture, customer preferences, business practices, and institutional forces increase transaction costs when conducting investment abroad [12,19,20]. Furthermore, information asymmetry in foreign markets requires great efforts from executives to adjust to local market conditions, posting significant challenges in achieving strategic objectives [21,22]. Empirical studies demonstrate consistent evidence about the greater challenges in foreign investments, where foreign acquirers tend to pay more acquisition premiums [23] and suffer a higher failure rate [24], and in general, overseas investments receive much lower gains than their domestic equivalents [16,25].…”
Section: Challenges Of Fdismentioning
confidence: 99%
“…However, unlike ACs that brings the acquired entity into the acquirer's existing governance system, JVs require extensive coordination efforts from the investing firms, because their shared management requires time-consuming coordination of joint activities between the partners [29]. The coordination challenges found in JVs is likely to be magnified in an international setting, because partners may have to strive even harder to achieve consensus due of dissimilar cultural and institutional backgrounds [22,30,31]. Summing up the above discussion, a pool of related experience within the focal entry mode may enable directors to develop relevant skills to apply on the focal FDI, whereas non-focal entry mode experience may generate little value.…”
Section: Specific Learning From Director Fdi Experience Within Focal mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Another important indicator for endogenous uncertainty is the existence of prior cooperation between the partners. Prior cooperation can be used to overcome information asymmetry among partners (Reuer and Koza, 2000;Vanhaverbeke et al, 2002;Williamson, 1985). Information asymmetry occurs when firms do not have access to all the relevant information to make an investment decision.…”
Section: Prior Cooperationmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Reddy, 1997 as well as Reuer and Koza, 2000). Besides, firms often seek to acquire very specific pieces of knowledge that can be accessed in a flexible and efficient way through co-operative agreements (see e.g.…”
Section: I-advantagesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…If a firm seeks to access knowledge residing in a foreign firm by means of M&A activities it may also has 17 to buy undesired assets and capabilities not suited to its objectives; moreover, it is difficult to extract knowledge from the target firm's R&D activities as these are embedded in a unique company culture. Hence, acquiring complementary knowledge through M&A can be very costly (for these arguments see Hennart andReddy, 1997 as well as Reuer and Koza, 2000). Besides, firms often seek to acquire very specific pieces of knowledge that can be accessed in a flexible and efficient way through co-operative agreements (see e.g.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%