Asymmetric Information in Consumer Contracts: The Challenge That Is Yet to Be Met

Becher, Shmuel I.

doi:10.1111/j.1744-1714.2008.00068.x

Cited by 41 publications

(9 citation statements)

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“…It is not unusual that consumers are uninformed about risks which affect their ability to choose terms which reflect their preferences correctly. Firms often exploit this ignorance by degrading contract quality intentionally and will then have little incentive to offer better deals as these will not increase sales (Bechern, 2008).…”

Section: Information Imperfect Information and Asymmetric Informationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Econometric modelling of risk adverse behaviours of entrepreneurs in the provision of house fittings in China

2012

CEB

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Entrepreneurs have always born the risk of running their business. They reap a profit in return for their risk taking and work. Housing developers are no different. In many countries, such as Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States, they interpret the tastes of the buyers and provide the dwellings they develop with basic fittings such as floor and wall coverings, bathroom fittings and kitchen cupboards. In mainland China, however, in most of the developments, units or houses are sold without floor or wall coverings, kitchen or bathroom fittings. What is the motive behind this choice? This paper analyses the factors affecting housing developers’ decisions to provide fittings based on 1701 housing developments in Hangzhou, Chongqing and Hangzhou using a Probit model. The results show that developers build a higher proportion of bare units in mainland China when: 1) there is shortage of housing; 2) land costs are high so that the comparative costs of providing fittings become relatively low.

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Section: Information Imperfect Information and Asymmetric Informationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Econometric modelling of risk adverse behaviours of entrepreneurs in the provision of house fittings in China

2012

CEB

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“…Cả trên lý thuyết và thực tiễn đều chứng minh được rằng trong giao dịch với thương nhân, người tiêu dùng luôn ở vị trí yếu thế bởi "tính bất cân xứng về thông tin" (Asymmetric information); hầu hết các thông tin về hàng hóa dịch vụ đều do nhà sản xuất cung cấp và không dễ gì kiểm chứng được, vì vậy NTD dễ bị lạm dụng thông qua những hành vi thương mại không công bằng của nhà sản xuất [10]. Chính vì vậy luật bảo vệ NTD của hầu hết các quốc gia trên thế giới đều có những quy định mang tính "thiên vị", tạo điều kiện thuận lợi cho NTD trong giải quyết tranh chấp.…”

Section: Về Nghĩa Vụ Chứng Minh Thiệt Hại Và Trách Nhiệm Chứng Minh Cunclassified

Từ vụ kiện Apple Inc. làm chậm iPhone ở Việt Nam: Bàn về xu hướng khởi kiện tập thể trong giải quyết tranh chấp tiêu dùng

Thị¹

2018

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Ngày 10/1/2018 hai luật sư Việt Nam đại diện cho một số lượng lớn người tiêu dùng trên cả nước khởi kiện Apple Inc. ra Tòa án nhân dân Thành phố Hồ Chí Minh vì lý do tập đoàn này vi phạm trách nhiệm của nhà sản xuất gây thiệt hại cho người sử dụng iPhone các phiên bản cũ ở Việt Nam. Vụ kiện này đã nhanh chóng thu hút được sự quan tâm của giới hành nghề luật, các nhà nghiên cứu và dư luận xã hội. Bài viết này sẽ phân tích và chỉ ra các thách thức pháp lý mà vụ kiện đặt ra đối với hệ thống tòa án và xu hướng tất yếu của quy trình khởi kiện tập thể trong luật tố tụng dân sự Việt Nam

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“…I will explore all of these problems here, with particular emphasis on the third, but my main interest lies elsewhere: rearview cameras count as "experience goods"; people do not know their value until they have had experience with them (Nelson, 1970;Laband, 1991;Frost et al, 2008). In the domain of regulation, a great deal of attention has been paid to asymmetric information (see, e.g., Morse, 1980;Becher, 2008;Akinbami, 2011), which may call for disclosure remedies or even mandates and bans. By contrast, no attention appears to have been paid to the possibility that regulatory benefits will produce experience goods, and for that reason increase social welfare.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Rear Visibility and Some Unresolved Problems for Economic Analysis (With Notes on Experience Goods)

Sunstein

2019

J. Benefit Cost Anal.

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In 2014, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration finalized its rear visibility regulation, which requires cameras in all new vehicles, with the goal of allowing drivers to see what is behind them and thus reducing backover accidents. In 2018, the Trump administration embraced the regulation. The rear visibility rule raises numerous puzzles. First, Congress’ grant of authority was essentially standardless – perhaps the most open-ended in all of federal regulatory law. Second, it is not easy to identify a market failure to justify the regulation. Third, the monetized costs of the regulation greatly exceeded the monetized benefits, and yet on welfare grounds, the regulation can plausibly be counted as a significant success. Rearview cameras produce a set of benefits that are hard to quantify, including increased ease of driving, and those benefits might have been made a part of “breakeven analysis,” accompanying standard cost-benefit analysis. In addition, rearview cameras significantly improve the experience of driving, and it is plausible to think that in deciding whether to demand them, many vehicle purchasers did not sufficiently anticipate that improvement. This is a problem of limited foresight; rearview cameras are “experience goods.” A survey conducted in 2019 strongly supports this proposition, finding that about 56 % of consumers would demand at least $300 to buy a car without a rearview camera, and that fewer than 6 % would demand $50 or less. Almost all of that 6 % consists of people who do not own a car with a rearview camera. (The per-person cost is usually under $50.) These conclusions have general implications for other domains in which regulation has the potential to improve social welfare, even if it fails standard cost-benefit analysis; the defining category involves situations in which people lack experience with a good whose provision might have highly beneficial welfare effects.

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Asymmetric Information in Consumer Contracts: The Challenge That Is Yet to Be Met

Cited by 41 publications

References 0 publications

Econometric modelling of risk adverse behaviours of entrepreneurs in the provision of house fittings in China

Econometric modelling of risk adverse behaviours of entrepreneurs in the provision of house fittings in China

Từ vụ kiện Apple Inc. làm chậm iPhone ở Việt Nam: Bàn về xu hướng khởi kiện tập thể trong giải quyết tranh chấp tiêu dùng

Rear Visibility and Some Unresolved Problems for Economic Analysis (With Notes on Experience Goods)

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