Asymmetric International Minimum Quality Standards and Vertical Differentiation

Boom, Anette

doi:10.2307/2950427

Cited by 113 publications

(81 citation statements)

References 7 publications

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“…Maxwell (1998), Puller (2006) and Garella (2006) evaluate the effects on the incentive to innovate; Boom (1995) and Lutz and Baliamoune-Lutz (2003) consider the role of minimum quality standards in international trade models; Lee and Phuyal (2013) In contrast to the more recent literature cited above we are not concerned with advanced topics like, e.g., collusion or the incentive to innovate. Instead, our work is in the spirit of the earlier contributions to the literature as we explore the more fundamental question whether or not a dynamic standard according to the Japanese Top Runner Program is an appropriate instrument at all when the regulator aims at increasing energy efficiency or total welfare.…”

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confidence: 99%

On Dynamic Standards for Energy Efficiency in Differentiated Duopoly

Michaelis¹,

Ziesemer²

2017

JITE

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Abstract. We consider a two-periods-model of differentiated duopoly. Firms produce an energy consuming household durable differentiated by its energy efficiency. Consumers differ by the weight they apply to their future energy costs when deciding which product to buy. In line with the Japanese Top Runner Program, the regulator introduces a minimum efficiency standard in period t=2 which is fixed according to the efficiency of the product supplied by the high efficiency firm in t=1. We show that in t=1 both firms supply lower efficiency products and the high efficiency firm gains in market share and profits. In t=2 these effects are reversed. Calculated over both periods, total energy consumption does not change. Although there is no ecological effect, total welfare increases because price competition becomes tighter and the cost savings accruing to the consumers exceed the firms' losses in profits. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may

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confidence: 99%

On Dynamic Standards for Energy Efficiency in Differentiated Duopoly

Michaelis¹,

Ziesemer²

2017

JITE

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“…We conjecture that the companies with certain characteristics such as international exposure for example obtain additional value from employing the same financial reporting system as the rest of the network participants will continue to rise. To this end, these firms drive the standardization process by adopting the same set of standards rather early [11][12][13][14][15][16]. To this purpose, instead of examining gains and losses associated with IFRS adoption, we identify firm-specific characteristics that associate with the likelihood of the adoption.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In addition, in a period of globalization it is important to better understand firm-specific characteristics associated with companies' decisions to standardize their business practices, and financial reporting in particular [7][8][9][10][11][12][13][14][15][16][17][18][19][20][21][22][23][24][25]. For the purpose of our study, our sample of companies have been grouped into three categories (1) early adopters, (2) those that presumably lack the incentives to adopt early 2005 adopters; and (3) those that did not perceive IFRS adoption advantages, and thus postponed the adoption (2007 adopters).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Corporate Characteristics Motivating Standardization: The Case of Accounting Convergence in European Union

Krivogorsky¹,

Chang²,

El³

2016

International JAR

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To identify how corporate characteristics impact the decision to converge, we tested three groups of European firms assigned into a group by the time of the IFRS adoption. Following the theory on network externalities, we hypothesize that companies with more business complexity and higher value benefit from a positive network effect and therefore, represent a driving force in accounting standardization. We provide evidence, that a firm's business complexity and valuation characteristics have a significant impact on IFRS adoption. We also document that the extenuating effects of jurisdictions and national levels of bureaucratic formalities in business are factors that affect firms' IFRS adoption decisions.

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“…Crampes and Hollander (1995) investigated the use of a MQS with quality-dependent marginal costs and found that in contrast to Ronnen (1991) a MQS may not always benet consumers. Boom (1995) added the international trade dimension and showed how asymmetric quality regulation in dierent countries could have spillover eects in otherwise segregated markets.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%