Asymmetric Nash bargaining solutions and competitive payoffs

Brangewitz, Sonja; Gamp, Jan-Philip

doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2013.08.013

Cited by 6 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 8 publications

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“…In some extent, similar characteristic of this process can be observed within the structure of classical economic games in the literature, such as the Gibbons (1992) descriptions, Rubinstein (1982) and Sobel and Takahashi (1983) sequential bargaining models and Von Stackelberg (1934) model of duopoly. Some recent game approaches have similar characteristics with the present modeling (Brangewitz and Gamp, 2013;Bolton and Karagözo glu, 2016;Geraskin, 2017;Nepomuceno and Costa, 2014;Santos et al, 2017;Wu and Wang, 2017) The negotiation will be characterized as a dynamic negotiation of complete and perfect information, which means that not only each negotiator has the complete information on the payoff function of his/her counterpart, but also the entire history behind the negotiation so far (strategies adopted, interactions, moves and choices) is of common knowledge (Gibbons, 1992). The timing of the bargain goes as follows:…”

Section: Sequential Bargains With Asymmetric and Mutual Negotiation Knowledgementioning

confidence: 89%

Modeling sequential bargains and personalities in democratic deliberation systems

Nepomuceno¹,

Moura

Costa

2018

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Purpose This paper aims to introduce a negotiation support system (NSS) with a theoretical modeling that considers the aspects of human personality and negotiator’s behavior to assist the decision-making of public managers and stakeholders in democratic bargaining processes and support social-efficient outcomes. Design/methodology/approach A game theoretical modeling of public participatory negotiations characterized by complete and perfect information is explored with the inclusion of personality aspects and negotiation styles. The importance of the negotiation knowledge disclosure in the sequential bargains of participative budgeting is highlighted by an experiment with 162 state-owned companies’ managers and graduate students to present the contribution of the system’s applicability. Findings A considerable number of Pareto-efficient deliberation agreements are obtained with few interactions when the negotiation strategies and the personality aspects of opponents and stakeholders are freely available (a symmetry in the public negotiation knowledge). In addition to the set of Pareto-efficient agreements, those with the best social outcome (i.e. that maximize the group satisfaction despite individual losses) are observed when the informational tool for personality and negotiation style inference is enabled. Originality/value Many scholars argue for Pareto-efficient allocation instead of equal divisions of resources within participative democracies and public governance. This work provides a new system with an empirical application and theoretical modeling which may support those arguments based on the nonverbal negotiation aspects.

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Section: Sequential Bargains With Asymmetric and Mutual Negotiation Knowledgementioning

confidence: 89%

Modeling sequential bargains and personalities in democratic deliberation systems

Nepomuceno¹,

Moura

Costa

2018

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“…Therefore, our results can be seen as a market foundation of game theoretic solution concepts that select closed subsets of the inner core. For the particular class of bargaining games a more precise presentation of the idea of a market foundation can be found in Trockel (1996Trockel ( , 2005 and Brangewitz and Gamp (2011).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Competitive outcomes and the inner core of NTU market games

Brangewitz

Gamp

2014

Econ Theory

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We consider the inner core as a solution concept for cooperative games with nontransferable utility (NTU) and its relationship to competitive equilibria of markets that are induced by an NTU game. We investigate the relationship between certain subsets of the inner core for NTU market games and competitive payoff vectors of markets linked to the NTU market game. This can be considered as the case in between the two extreme cases of Qin (1993). We extend the results of Qin (1993) to a large class of closed subsets of the inner core: Given an NTU market game we construct a market depending on a given closed subset of its inner core. This market represents the game and further has the given set as the set of payoffs of competitive equilibria. It turns out that this market is not determined uniquely and thus we obtain a class of markets with the desired property.

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“…The unique Walras stable competitive equilibrium of this economy is shown to coincide with a non-symmetric Nash bargaining solution of the underlying bargaining game with weights corresponding to the shares in production." Brangewitz and Gamp (2013) show that for every possible vector of weights of an asymmetric Nash bargaining solution there exists a market that has this asymmetric Nash bargaining solution as its unique competitive payoff vector. In a related endeavor Sertel and Yildiz (2003) pose the following question: "Is there a bargaining solution that pays out theWalrasian welfare for exchange economies?"…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 97%

Existence of Competitive Equilibrium in Linear Exchange Economies: A Simple Proof Using Brouwer’s Fixed Point Theorem

Lahiri

2012

SSRN Journal

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Asymmetric Nash bargaining solutions and competitive payoffs

Cited by 6 publications

References 8 publications

Modeling sequential bargains and personalities in democratic deliberation systems

Modeling sequential bargains and personalities in democratic deliberation systems

Competitive outcomes and the inner core of NTU market games

Existence of Competitive Equilibrium in Linear Exchange Economies: A Simple Proof Using Brouwer’s Fixed Point Theorem

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