Asymmetric oligopoly and evolutionary stability

Leininger, Wolfgang; Moghadam, Hamed Markazi

doi:10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2018.08.002

Cited by 5 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 18 publications

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“…An interesting and challenging extension of these findings under endogenous entry would be to consider heterogeneous players with different marginal effort costs. Applications of ESS to finite heterogeneous populations of players have occurred in oligopoly theory; for two different approaches see Tanaka (1999) and Leininger and Moghadam (2018).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Evolutionary equilibrium in contests with stochastic participation: Entry, effort and overdissipation

Hehenkamp

Leininger

2019

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

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This paper examines the evolutionary stability of behaviour in contests where players' participation can be stochastic. We find, for exogenously given participation probabilities, players exert more effort under the concept of a finite-population evolutionarily stable strategy (FPESS) than under Nash equilibrium (NE). We show that there is exante overdissipation under FPESS for sufficiently large participation probabilities, if, and only if, the impact function is convex. With costly endogenous entry, players enter the contest with a higher probability and exert more effort under FPESS than under NE. Importantly, under endogenous entry, overdissipation can occur for all (Tullock) contest success functions, in particular those with concave impact functions.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Evolutionary equilibrium in contests with stochastic participation: Entry, effort and overdissipation

Hehenkamp

Leininger

2019

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

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Price and non-price competition in an oligopoly: an analysis of relative payoff maximizers

Moghadam

2019

J Evol Econ

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Do fi rms under relative payoff s maximizing (RPM) behavior always choose a strategy profi le that results in tougher competition compared to fi rms under absolute payoff s maximizing (APM) behavior? In this paper we will address this issue through a simple model of symmetric oligopoly where fi rms select a two dimensional strategy set of price and a non-price variable known as quality simultaneously. In conclusion, our results show that equilibrium solutions of RPM and APM are distinct. We further characterize the comparison between these two equilibrium concepts. In particular, RPM does not always lead to stricter competition compared to the Nash equilbrium (APM). In fact, the comparison between two equilibrium concepts is infl uenced by the parameters of demand curve and cost function. The conditions, derived in this paper, determine under which circumstances RPM induces more competition or less competition w.r.t the price or non-price dimension.

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A nonparametric approach to evolutionary oligopoly games: An application to the crude oil industry

Moghadam

2021

Economic Modelling

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Asymmetric oligopoly and evolutionary stability

Cited by 5 publications

References 18 publications

Evolutionary equilibrium in contests with stochastic participation: Entry, effort and overdissipation

Evolutionary equilibrium in contests with stochastic participation: Entry, effort and overdissipation

Price and non-price competition in an oligopoly: an analysis of relative payoff maximizers

A nonparametric approach to evolutionary oligopoly games: An application to the crude oil industry

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