Asymmetries in international environmental agreements

Pavlova, Yulia; Zeeuw, Aart de

doi:10.1017/s1355770x12000289

Cited by 61 publications

(40 citation statements)

References 16 publications

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“…Transfers are used as a tool to incentivize participation in an agreement such that larger coalitions may satisfy their internal stability conditions (Pavlova & de Zeeuw, 2013). We applied an optimal sharing rule for the outcomes of our spatial biodiversity model to see whether larger stable coalitions could be achieved.…”

Section: Inclusion Of Transfersmentioning

confidence: 99%

International cooperation on biodiversity conservation when spatial structures matter

Alvarado-Quesada

Weikard

2017

Spatial Economic Analysis

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International cooperation on biodiversity conservation when spatial structures matter. Spatial Economic Analysis. This paper considers the stability of international environmental agreements (IEAs) for biodiversity conservation with an explicit spatial structure. It studies the impact of distance between countries on coalition stability. It analyses a circular spatial structure with different spatial patterns. Robust results are obtained for a wide range of cost-and-benefit parameters: stable coalitions have a maximum size of two members. The best global payoff is obtained when coalitions are composed of neighbouring countries with the smallest possible distance. A 'remoteness effect' is observed, i.e., some coalitions of two members are unstable when one of the signatory countries is far away from the other coalition member and from the singletons. KEYWORDS biodiversity conservation, coalition formation, spatial structure of cooperation, international environmental agreements RÉSUMÉLa coopération internationale en matière de la conservation de la biodiversité à l'heure où les structures spatiales importent. Spatial Economic Analysis. Cet article considère la stabilité des accords internationaux sur l'environnement en faveur de la conservation de la biodiversité où la structure spatiale est très évidente. On étudie l'impact de la distance entre les pays sur la stabilité de la coalition. On analyse une structure spatiale circulaire à partir des configurations spatiales différentes. On obtient des résultats solides pour une grande série de paramètres coûts-bénéfices: la taille maximale des coalitions stables est de deux. On réalise la meilleure récompense au moment où les coalitions sont composées de pays limitrophes et dont la distance est à son minimum. Un 'effet isolement' est à noter, c'est-à-dire certaines coalitions comportant deux membres sont instables quand l'un des pays signataires est situé loin de l'autre membre de la coalition et des pays agissant à titre individuel.MOTS-CLÉS conservation de la biodiversité, établissement d'une coalition, structure spatiale de la coopération, accords environnementaux internationaux RESUMEN Cooperación internacional para la conservación de la biodiversidad cuando las estructuras espaciales son importantes. Spatial Economic Analysis. En este artículo consideramos la estabilidad de los acuerdos internacionales sobre el medio ambiente para la conservación de la biodiversidad con una estructura espacial explícita. Estudiamos el impacto de la distancia entre los países en lo que respecta a la estabilidad de las coaliciones. Analizamos una estructura espacial de tipo circular con diferentes patrones espaciales. Obtenemos resultados sólidos para una amplia gama de parámetros de costes y beneficios: las coaliciones estables tienen un tamaño máximo de dos miembros. Los mejores beneficios globales se obtienen cuando las coaliciones están compuestas por países vecinos con la menor distancia posible. Observamos un 'efecto de distancia', es decir, algunas coaliciones de do...

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Section: Inclusion Of Transfersmentioning

confidence: 99%

International cooperation on biodiversity conservation when spatial structures matter

Alvarado-Quesada

Weikard

2017

Spatial Economic Analysis

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“…Recent studies on the economic analysis of the formation and stability of IEAs (e.g., Finus 2001; Rubio and Ulph 2006;Pavlova and de Zeeuw 2013) have drawn on the seminal work of D 'Aspremont et al (1983), Carraro and Siniscalco (1993), Barrett (1994) and others. Most of this literature refers to the problem of global warming and IEAs for greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions control.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

International Environmental Agreements for biodiversity conservation: a game-theoretic analysis

Alvarado-Quesada

Weikard

2017

Int Environ Agreements

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This paper contributes to the emerging literature on International Environmental Agreements with an analysis of key characteristics for biodiversity conservation. We study three features that are specific to an international conservation agreement: the existence of a natural upper bound of conservation in each country, the importance of local benefits, and the subadditivity of the global conservation function. We consider asymmetries in benefits and costs of conservation and, separately, in the upper bound of conservation in each country, and we examine the impacts of these features on coalition stability and on the effectiveness of biodiversity agreements. Results show that subadditivity of the global conservation function can lead to larger stable coalitions. The inclusion of a transfer scheme that might be implemented through, e.g., international trade of biodiversity credits, can have an impact on coalition composition and can improve conservation outcomes and the size of stable coalitions in certain ranges of the parameter space.

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“…8 Much of the literature on IEAs examines the case of symmetric countries. However, some studies provide a theoretical examination of countries that are asymmetric in terms of their size and marginal damage from pollution (Kolstad, 2010), marginal costs and benefits of abatement (McGinty, 2007;Pavlova and de Zeeuw, 2013), and technologies (Mendez and Trelles, 2000).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Economic Targets and Loss‐Aversion in International Environmental Cooperation

İriş

2017

Environmental Economics and Sustainability

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In the standard emission problem, each country's ruling party decides on an optimal level of emissions by analyzing the cost and benefit to the country. However, such policy decisions are often influenced by political parties' incentives to be elected. Voters tend to give higher priority to economic issues than they do to environmental ones. As a result, political parties have additional incentives to reach a critical economic benefit level, at a cost of higher emission level, in order to satisfy voters' expectations in economic issues. Therefore, this study explores the implications of political parties being averse to insufficient economic performance relative to a critical economic target level on sustaining an international environmental agreement on emission levels. In doing so, we allow countries to have asymmetric concerns about economic targets, as well as asymmetric technology levels. We find that stronger concerns about economic targets deter the most cooperative emission levels countries could jointly sustain. Furthermore, technological asymmetry could either deepen or offset this impact. These results suggest that efforts on achieving substantial international environmental agreements should be supported at the citizen level to eliminate the adverse effects.

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Asymmetries in international environmental agreements

Cited by 61 publications

References 16 publications

International cooperation on biodiversity conservation when spatial structures matter

International cooperation on biodiversity conservation when spatial structures matter

International Environmental Agreements for biodiversity conservation: a game-theoretic analysis

Economic Targets and Loss‐Aversion in International Environmental Cooperation

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