Asymmetries in rent seeking

Dari‐Mattiacci, Giuseppe; Langlais, Éric; Lovat, Bruno; Parisi, Francesco

doi:10.4337/9781782544944.00012

Cited by 7 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 21 publications

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“…26 These results are interesting when compared to other asymmetries in litigation contests. Dari-Mattiacci et al (2015) showed that asymmetries in parties' payoffs and efforts may arise in the presence of asymmetries in marginal returns to effort, valuations of the rent, and bargaining power. The contour-plot 2b shows the values of the individual equilibrium effort under different combinations of the evidence standards and the objective merits of the case.…”

Section: Litigation Efforts and Equilibrium Behaviormentioning

confidence: 99%

Standards of Proof and Civil Litigation: A Game-Theoretic Analysis

Guerra

Luppi

Parisi

2018

The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics

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In litigation models, the parties’ probability to succeed in a lawsuit hinge upon the merits of the parties’ claims and their litigation efforts. In this paper we extend this framework to consider an important procedural aspect of the legal system: the standard of proof. We recast the conventional litigation model to consider how alternative standards of proof affect litigation choices. We analyze the interrelation between different standards of proof, the effectiveness of the parties’ efforts, and the merits of the case. We study how these factors jointly affect the parties’ litigation expenditures, the selection of cases brought to the courts, pretrial bargain solutions and preemptive strategies. Our results show that standards of proof are not only instrumental to balancing the competing goals of access to justice and judicial truth-finding, but they also play a critical role in affecting parties’ litigation investments and settlement choices, and in sorting the mix of cases that will actually be filed and defended in courts. The understanding of the sorting effect of standards of proof sheds light on their role as a policy instrument in civil litigation.

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Section: Litigation Efforts and Equilibrium Behaviormentioning

confidence: 99%

Standards of Proof and Civil Litigation: A Game-Theoretic Analysis

Guerra

Luppi

Parisi

2018

The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics

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“…The party with the largest cost of effort can effectively choose among a more restricted set 1 For recent reviews, see Konrad (2008a, 2008b); Congleton and Hillman (2015). A review of the literature on asymmetric rent-seeking games, which will form the basis for our model, can be found in Dari-Mattiacci and Parisi (2015).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Discrete Rent-Seeking Games with an Application to Evidence Production

Dari‐Mattiacci¹,

Kornhauser²

2020

Supreme Court Economic Review

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Evidence production at trial, the accumulation of patents in a technological race, and lobbying are contests that often involve strategic choices over a discrete set of options. The literature has primarily focused on games with continuous effort choices. We fill this gap by studying a rent-seeking game with discrete effort choices and, for a significant class of games, derive a transformation rule that allows one to find the equilibrium of the discrete game from the equilibrium of the continuous game, which is much simpler to identify. We also discuss the limits of this approach and how well the continuous game approximates the discrete one.

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“…The exception occurs in the very particular case in which the returns to scale in the production of legal arguments are decreasing and sufficiently low (Farmer and Pecorino, 1999). 3 However, in this case, the introduction of realistic considerations, such as, for example, asymmetries between individuals, outside options or other aspects is analytically intractable (Dari-Mattiacci et al, 2015). Analytical tractability can be recovered by assuming constant returns to scale in the production of legal arguments, but then, as explained, no case reaches trial under the English system, which is counterfactual; 4 thereby restricting to a great extent the generalized application of the "rent-seeking" CSF, and questioning whether this approach to litigation is complete enough.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Argumentation quantity and quality: A litigation success function

Osório

Luppi

2019

International Review of Law and Economics

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Arguments are statements used to persuade someone or in support of a claim. However, these are not perfect and the opponents can exploit them to build their own arguments. In this paper, we propose a new litigation success function that (i) considers the intrinsic and immutable strength of the arguments presented by the plaintiff and defendant, (ii) solves the limitations of the existing literature in dealing with the English fee-shifting system, and (iii) is flexible and tractable in analytical terms. As a robustness check, the proposed litigation success function confirms several important results in the literature, but also brings new insights on how argumentation strength affects the individuals' efforts and the decision to file and contest lawsuits in different fee-shifting systems. In this context, we also show how to introduce the worldwide-accepted presumption of innocence in favor of the defendant and the possibility of settlement.

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Asymmetries in rent seeking

Cited by 7 publications

References 21 publications

Standards of Proof and Civil Litigation: A Game-Theoretic Analysis

Standards of Proof and Civil Litigation: A Game-Theoretic Analysis

Discrete Rent-Seeking Games with an Application to Evidence Production

Argumentation quantity and quality: A litigation success function

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