Asymmetry, uncertainty, and limits in a binary choice experiment with positive spillovers

Sorensen, Andrea

doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2015.03.021

Cited by 3 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 22 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…The basic game is identical to the asymmetric, non-probabilistic game in [12]. A group of N agents, each with an initial endowment, e > 0, must each choose one of two options.…”

Section: Theoretical Model and Predictionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The game in [12] was motivated by the individual vaccination decision, with Option A representing a choice to receive a costly but fully effective vaccine, and Option B representing a choice not to vaccinate and potentially get sick, with one's likelihood of getting sick increasing with the number of unvaccinated individuals.…”

Section: Theoretical Model and Predictionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…2 l H (n) and l L (n) are as in [12], and were determined by a more complex probabilistic contagion model in which the application of interest was individual vaccination decisions.…”

Section: Theoretical Model and Predictionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Based on the games in Sorensen (2015) [12], subjects begin with an initial endowment and face a decision between an option with a certain loss and an option with a loss that is increasing in the number of individuals who choose it. The exact parameterizations are chosen so that no player ever has a dominant strategy, and initial endowment levels are varied so that in one of the two decision sequences subjects may incur a loss greater than their endowment (i.e., receive a negative payoff).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The exact parameterizations are chosen so that no player ever has a dominant strategy, and initial endowment levels are varied so that in one of the two decision sequences subjects may incur a loss greater than their endowment (i.e., receive a negative payoff). To avoid the obvious problem of subjects owing the experimenter money at the end of a session, each subject participated in two sequences of decision rounds, one with a higher endowment level used in [12], and one with a much lower endowment level. This design ensures that each subject's total earnings across both sequences are positive, while still allowing earnings to potentially be negative in one of the two sequences.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 4 more Smart Citations

Creating a Domain of Losses in the Laboratory: Effects of Endowment Size

Sorensen

2018

Games

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This study examines the effects of initial endowment size on individual behavior in a binary choice game with no dominant strategy. Subjects make decisions in two, theoretically identical sequences, differing in initial endowment levels only. Each decision involves a choice between an option with a certain loss and an option with a loss that is increasing in the number of individuals who choose it. For the higher endowment level, all subjects are guaranteed a positive payoff. For the lower endowment level, subjects who choose the uncertain loss option could receive a negative payoff. The results indicate that in the first round of play, subjects with the higher endowment level choose the certain loss option significantly more often than subjects with the lower endowment level. There are, however, no significant differences in behavior beyond the first few rounds of play.

show abstract

“…The basic game is identical to the asymmetric, non-probabilistic game in [12]. A group of N agents, each with an initial endowment, e > 0, must each choose one of two options.…”

Section: Theoretical Model and Predictionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Theoretical Model and Predictionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…2 l H (n) and l L (n) are as in [12], and were determined by a more complex probabilistic contagion model in which the application of interest was individual vaccination decisions.…”

Section: Theoretical Model and Predictionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 3 more Smart Citations

Creating a Domain of Losses in the Laboratory: Effects of Endowment Size

Sorensen

2018

Games

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

A family of block-wise one-factor distributions for modeling high-dimensional binary data

Marbac

Sedki

2017

Computational Statistics & Data Analysis

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The role of vaccine effectiveness on individual vaccination decisions and welfare

Sorensen

2023

J Public Economic Theory

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This paper examines a theoretical model designed to characterize a static, individual vaccination decision environment. I identify and characterize both equilibrium and socially optimal vaccination behavior and determine how this behavior changes as the effectiveness of the vaccine changes. I also evaluate the individual and social welfare implications of a change in vaccine effectiveness. I find that under certain conditions, an increase in vaccine effectiveness can decrease the number of agents vaccinating in equilibrium due to the positive external effects of vaccination. Notably, it is also possible for individual and total welfare to decrease. This is an undesirable, and perhaps unexpected, consequence of better vaccines. Fortunately, welfare at the social optimum always increases as vaccine effectiveness increases. However, equilibrium behavior often falls short of the social optimum due to the positive externalities created by vaccinating.

show abstract

Asymmetry, uncertainty, and limits in a binary choice experiment with positive spillovers

Cited by 3 publications

References 22 publications

Creating a Domain of Losses in the Laboratory: Effects of Endowment Size

Creating a Domain of Losses in the Laboratory: Effects of Endowment Size

A family of block-wise one-factor distributions for modeling high-dimensional binary data

The role of vaccine effectiveness on individual vaccination decisions and welfare

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About