At least you tried: The value of De Dicto concern to do the right thing

Abstract

I argue that there are some situations in which it is praiseworthy to be motivated only by moral rightness de dicto, even if this results in wrongdoing. I consider a set of cases that are challenging for views that dispute this, prioritising concern for what is morally important (de re, and not de dicto) in moral evaluation (for example, Arpaly, 2003; Arpaly & Schroeder, 2013; Harman 2015; Weatherson, 2019). In these cases, the agent is not concerned about what is morally important (de re), does the wrong thing, but nevertheless seems praiseworthy rather than blameworthy. I argue that the views under discussion cannot accommodate this, and should be amended to recognise that it is often praiseworthy to be motivated to do what is right (de dicto).

Paternalism Is Not Less Wrong in Intimate Relationships

“…We are aware that matters are more complicated here because of the distinction between de re and de dicto moral motivation (see, e.g.,Carbonell, 2013;Field, 2022;Smith, 1994). But since our argument does not rely on the argument suggested in this paragraph-we assume that the interference is paternalistic-we can set this problem aside.…”

Moral worth

“…See Hills (2009) on how what she calls moral understanding can generate practical instrumental reasons not to defer to moral experts. See also Field (2022), Grant (2023).…”