At odds with Europe: explaining populist radical right voting in Central and Eastern Europe

Santana, Andrés; Zagórski, Piotr; Rama, José

doi:10.1080/21599165.2020.1737523

Cited by 40 publications

(29 citation statements)

References 76 publications

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“…The rightwing populist parties (Dawn/SPD and National Front) tend to attract voters with lower levels of political trust, higher levels of Euroscepticism, and stronger anti-immigration preferences. These findings are consistent with existing literature on rightwing populists that has identified commonalities across these parties' electorates (Allen, 2017;Rooduijn, 2018;Santana et al, 2020). A distinct ideological profile coupled with specific social groups receptive to their narratives allows us to identify rightwing populist parties as an analytically distinct party family.…”

Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 88%

“…This stems from the nature of the populist parties that politicize anti-elite sentiment and attack political establishments by presenting themselves as defenders of 'ordinary people' (Mair, 2002;Mudde, 2007). Studies have found that such ideological appeals attract voters who are dissatisfied with political establishments and have higher levels of political mistrust (Norris & Inglehart, 2019;Oesch, 2008;Santana, Zagórski, & Rama, 2020).…”

Section: Variation Across Electoratesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…For my analysis, I devised a study modeled after previous research (Allen, 2017;Rooduijn, 2018;Santana et al, 2020). The analysis is set at the individual level and is based on the data from the ESS, which is collected biennially in 2014, 2016, and 2018, when data on parties in their respective countries is available.…”

Section: Data and Analytical Proceduresmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The level of political mistrust, which is commonly used in the literature as a proxy for anti-establishment sentiment (Santana et al, 2020), was measured based on three correlated (0-10 scale) standardized variables that asked about respondents' levels of trust in political parties, politicians, and a country's parliament (Cronbach's = 0.74). The lower value of the coefficient of this variable corresponds to lower levels of institutional trust.…”

Section: Data and Analytical Proceduresmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Different Strokes for Different Folks: Who Votes for Technocratic Parties?

Snegovaya

2020

PaG

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In this study, I look at two types of political actors commonly described as ‘populist’ in literature—namely, rightwing populists and technocratic leaders like France’s Emmanuel Macron and the Czech Republic’s Andrej Babiš. While both types of political actors tend to emerge as a response to a decline in trust in established parties and adopt platforms with anti-establishment and monist elements, they also possess noticeably different qualities. Unlike rightwing populists, technocrats lack a distinctive ideological profile and tend to adopt more inclusive rhetoric by appealing to a broadly-defined community of people. When contrasted with supporters of rightwing populists, empirical analysis of supporters of Macron’s and Babiš’ parties shows that the two have few commonalities. Relatively few examples of such political leadership, the lack of a distinct ideological profile and the variation of their support bases suggest that one should use caution when conceptualizing technocratic populists as a distinct theoretical type.

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Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 88%

Section: Variation Across Electoratesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Data and Analytical Proceduresmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Data and Analytical Proceduresmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Different Strokes for Different Folks: Who Votes for Technocratic Parties?

Snegovaya

2020

PaG

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“…Whilst Giani and Meón (2019)'s findings might suggest that the 2016 Trump victory could further fan the flames of the European far-right, other empirical contributions suggests that it may have increased resilience against the rise of the anti-globalist nationalism these parties tend to advocate. Minkus et al (2019), for example, present causal evidence demonstrating that Trump's 2016 success also brought about a rise in 6 support for European integration, a liberal and pro-globalist policy dimensions that is often negatively correlated with far-right support (Santana et al, 2020;Vasilopoulou, 2018). The "rally around the EU" effect observed is, according to the authors, the result of citizens perceiving domestic liberal norms as being under threat from an external actor.…”

Section: Expectationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

When the US far-right sneezes, the European far-right catches a cold. Quasi-experimental of electoral contagion from Spain

Turnbull‐Dugarte¹,

Rama²

2021

Preprint

Self Cite

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Does the electoral defeat of a far-right party abroad influence support for far-right parties at home? By exploiting the quasi-experimental setting provided by the coincidental timing of Donald Trump’s 2020 electoral defeat with the Spanish Sociological Study’s monthly barometer data collection, we provide robust causal evidence to show that far-right’s electoral loss in the US had a negative contagious spillover effect on support for the Spanish far-right. Empirically we estimate treatment effects based on the as good as random exposure to the electoral results, as well as regression discontinuity models to isolate the causal impact of Donald Trump’s electoral defeat on support for Spain’s new far-right party, VOX. Our results - which are robust to various modelling approaches including covariate adjustment, regional fixed effects, placebo issues and nearest-neighbour matching - demonstrate that Trump’s defeat to Joe Biden had a sizeable negative effect on support for VOX. The contagion effect is substantive: equal to 3-5 percentage-points among the general population and 8-11 percentage-points among right-wing voters. Our findings make an important contribution to the broader literature on electoral behaviour as they indicate that the electoral success of ideologically symmetrical parties abroad plays a role in understanding a party's domestic success.

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Populism unrestrained: Policy responses of the Orbán regime to the pandemic in 2020–2021

Ádám

Csaba

2022

European Policy Analysis

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The paper provides a case study on how the Orbán regime in Hungary has dealt with coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) in 2020-2021. Despite having led worldwide rankings in pandemic-related death rates since the second part of 2020, the government was not politically shaken by COVID-19. Institutionally unrestrained, the governing majority periodically renewed emergency legal regimes to control public discourses and curtail the financial resources of opposition-led local governments. The policy conduct of the regime is discussed in the context of authoritarian populism, which is conceptualized along a strategybased approach to populism. In this, authoritarian populism is seen to generate democratic legitimacy for dismantling the institutional foundations of liberal democracy and the rule of law. This had been happening in Hungary well before COVID-19 kicked in, but the pandemic provided enhanced opportunities for this strategy. Meanwhile, fiscal policies became increasingly expansionary, signalling a partial return to the practice of preelection overspending.

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At odds with Europe: explaining populist radical right voting in Central and Eastern Europe

Cited by 40 publications

References 76 publications

Different Strokes for Different Folks: Who Votes for Technocratic Parties?

Different Strokes for Different Folks: Who Votes for Technocratic Parties?

When the US far-right sneezes, the European far-right catches a cold. Quasi-experimental of electoral contagion from Spain

Populism unrestrained: Policy responses of the Orbán regime to the pandemic in 2020–2021

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