At the Crossroads of Policymaking: Executive Politics, Administrative Action, and Judicial Deference by the DC Circuit Court of Appeals (1985–1996)*

Caruson, Kiki; Bitzer, J. Michael

doi:10.1111/j.1467-9930.2004.00182.x

Cited by 12 publications

(10 citation statements)

References 34 publications

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“…Kritzer et al (2002) discovered significant differences in Supreme Court behavior before and after Chevron, but also found that these differences did not always operate in the ways expected. Caruson and Bitzer (2004) found that the DC Circuit Court of Appeals was not more likely to defer to agencies when a Chevron standard of review was applied, and Smith (2005) reported no differences in Supreme Court behavior pre-and post-Chevron. Miles and Sunstein (2006: 825-6), in their analysis of both appellate and Supreme Court decisions, concluded that application of Chevron is greatly affected by judges' policy convictions, and that Chevron 'has not had the disciplining effect that it was supposed to have'.…”

Section: Ambiguity Delegation and Judicial Deferencementioning

confidence: 98%

Ambiguous Statutes and Judicial Deference To Federal Agencies

Wright¹

2010

Journal of Theoretical Politics

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The Supreme Court's Chevron decision raises questions about why Congress passes ambiguous statutes and why courts defer to agencies rather than impose their own interpretations. This article presents a model of policymaking where the legislature chooses strategically between an ambiguous and explicit statute, and where rulemaking and judicial review follow. The analysis reveals that when statutes are ambiguous, judges gain few policy advantages by deciding strategically on the basis of their policy preferences as opposed to simply following Chevron precedent. The results shows that legislative policy entrepreneurs can frequently advance their policy interests more successfully with ambiguous than with explicit language.

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Section: Ambiguity Delegation and Judicial Deferencementioning

confidence: 98%

Ambiguous Statutes and Judicial Deference To Federal Agencies

Wright¹

2010

Journal of Theoretical Politics

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“…In other words, courts are more likely to defer to the agency when the perceived expertise of the agency is greater than that of the court. As Caruson and Bitzer (, 350) state, “In cases involving highly technical matters, a court is likely to defer to what has been recognized as the agency's superior subject‐matter expertise.”…”

Section: A Theory Of Appellate Court Decision Making In Unfair Labor mentioning

confidence: 99%

The Influence of Administrative Law Judge and Political Appointee Decisions on Appellate Courts in National Labor Relations Board Cases

Taratoot¹

2013

Law & Policy

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Scholars have long been simultaneously concerned with the factors that influence appellate court decision making and the level of deference that the courts allow for agencies. However, scholars have treated administrative agencies as unitary actors with a single level of decision making, but in reality agency decisions involve input from multiple actors within the agency. I argue that appellate courts rely more heavily on decisions made by actors in the bureaucracy with greater levels of expertise and who are less politically motivated as cues in their decision making. This theory is bolstered by legal precedent in the area of administrative law that suggests courts should more heavily rely on the expert judgment of administrative judges. Thus, as a result of their increased expertise, appearance of political neutrality, and institutional support, courts will be more reliant on decisions issued by administrative law judges (ALJs) than those issued by the political appointees as cues in their decision making. Using over 300 unfair labor practice decisions issued by the federal appeals courts on review of cases from the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or Board), I develop a model of appeals court decision making in unfair labor practice cases as a function of the initial decision of the ALJ, the final order of the political appointees of the NLRB, case characteristics, the ideology of the deciding appeals court panel, Supreme Court influence, and economic factors. Though the ideology of the court plays a role in its decision making, cues from ALJ decision making and that of the Board weigh more heavily in appellate court outcomes. However, cues from ALJ decisions play the most consistent role in appellate court decision making, even in more difficult cases. This has important implications for agency strategy in courts and suggests that future research should consider the influence of lower‐level decision making over appellate court decision making in the area of administrative law.

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“…While there is a substantial body of research examining judicial review of administrative actions (Carruba and Zorn ; Caruson and Bitzer ; Cohen and Spitzer ; Cross and Tiller ; Crowley ; Humphries and Songer ; Johnson ; ; Miles and Sunstein ; Revesz ; ; Sheehan ; ; Smith ; Willison ; Wright ; Yates ), Solicitor General influence (Black and Owens ; ; ), and executive branch enforcement of court rulings (Hume ; Spriggs ; ; Wagner ), there are only a handful of empirical and qualitative studies that examine how the threat of judicial review can influence administrative behavior (Canes‐Wrone ; Howard and Nixon ; Melnick ; Seidenfeld ; Wood and Waterman ). However, none has offered a systematic study of the courts' influence on rulemaking.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The President, the Court, and Policy Implementation

Thrower¹

2016

Pres Stud Q

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In contrast to research focused on presidential–congressional relations, this article explores the ways in which the president strategically accounts for the courts when deciding how to best influence policy implementation. I argue that as the courts become more ideologically distant from the president and thus more likely to strike down administrative actions, agencies engage in less rulemaking while the president issues more executive orders to supplement agencies' authority to act. An empirical analysis of federal macro‐level data as well as issue‐specific data on labor and environmental policy yields support for the theory's hypotheses.

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At the Crossroads of Policymaking: Executive Politics, Administrative Action, and Judicial Deference by the DC Circuit Court of Appeals (1985–1996)*

Cited by 12 publications

References 34 publications

Ambiguous Statutes and Judicial Deference To Federal Agencies

Ambiguous Statutes and Judicial Deference To Federal Agencies

The Influence of Administrative Law Judge and Political Appointee Decisions on Appellate Courts in National Labor Relations Board Cases

The President, the Court, and Policy Implementation

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