Attacking Beacon-Enabled 802.15.4 Networks

“…In [28] we introduced several attacks on the beacon-enabled 802.15.4 network. This work extends [28] with the addition of 3 new implemented attacks as well as the presentation of BCN-MiniSec to defend against the attacks.…”

Section: Attacks On Beacon-enabled 802154 Networkmentioning

confidence: 99%

Attacking and securing beacon-enabled 802.15.4 networks

et al. 2014

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“…Since there is no method of verifying of sensor nodes' identifiers (IDs), Jung et al [14] define two categories of variants of the IEEE 802.15.4 GTS Attack as follows.…”

Section: Guaranteed Time Slot (Gts) Attacksmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This causes the length of the CAP to momentarily fall below aMinCAPLength, thus reducing the amount of time which member nodes have in order to contend for channel access [1]. While this variant of the GTS Attack has not been previously mentioned in any references, its discovery is inspired by the brief statement made by Jung et al [14] that preventative actions of CAP maintenance are ineffective if a malicious node constantly sends either GTS requests or data at the assigned GTS during the CFP. 5.10.…”

Section: Dos Against Cap Maintenancementioning

confidence: 99%

A Comprehensive Taxonomy and Analysis of IEEE 802.15.4 Attacks

Amin

Abdel-Hamid

2016

Journal of Electrical and Computer Engineering

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The IEEE 802.15.4 standard has been established as the dominant enabling technology for Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs). With the proliferation of security-sensitive applications involving WSNs, WSN security has become a topic of great significance. In comparison with traditional wired and wireless networks, WSNs possess additional vulnerabilities which present opportunities for attackers to launch novel and more complicated attacks against such networks. For this reason, a thorough investigation of attacks against WSNs is required. This paper provides a single unified survey that dissects all IEEE 802.15.4 PHY and MAC layer attacks known to date. While the majority of existing references investigate the motive and behavior of each attack separately, this survey classifies the attacks according to clear metrics within the paper and addresses the interrelationships and differences between the attacks following their classification. The authors’ opinions and comments regarding the placement of the attacks within the defined classifications are also provided. A comparative analysis between the classified attacks is then performed with respect to a set of defined evaluation criteria. The first half of this paper addresses attacks on the IEEE 802.15.4 PHY layer, whereas the second half of the paper addresses IEEE 802.15.4 MAC layer attacks.

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Anomaly Detection in Beacon-Enabled IEEE 802.15.4 Wireless Sensor Networks

Karapistoli

Economides

2013

Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering

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Attacking Beacon-Enabled 802.15.4 Networks

Cited by 12 publications

References 18 publications

Attacking and securing beacon-enabled 802.15.4 networks

Attacking and securing beacon-enabled 802.15.4 networks

A Comprehensive Taxonomy and Analysis of IEEE 802.15.4 Attacks

Anomaly Detection in Beacon-Enabled IEEE 802.15.4 Wireless Sensor Networks

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