Attacks on Java Card 3.0 Combining Fault and Logical Attacks

Barbu, Guillaume; Thiebeauld, Hugues; Guerin, Vincent

doi:10.1007/978-3-642-12510-2_11

Cited by 59 publications

(43 citation statements)

References 8 publications

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“…In 2010, Barbu et al [194] along with Vétillard and Ferrari [198] used a similar attack methodology to Sere et al [216] that later came to be known as combined attacks. Later, the combined attack technique was extended to target various components of JCVM in [217] [220].…”

Section: Smart Card Runtime Environmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In the ICOM, such issues have limited impact because of the strict controls on application installation [190,194,195]. This means that compatibility, security, and reliability of an application with respect to an SCRT are evaluated before installing it.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Since then the technology has evolved to counter these threats to some extent. There has been a growing interest in combining the software and fault injection [194,198,199] attacks to subvert the protection mechanisms on a smart card, and such an attack vector is referred as combined attacks.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

User Centric Security Model for Tamper-Resistant Devices

Akram

Markantonakis

Mayes

2011

2011 IEEE 8th International Conference on E-Business Engineering

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Section: Smart Card Runtime Environmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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User Centric Security Model for Tamper-Resistant Devices

Akram

Markantonakis

Mayes

2011

2011 IEEE 8th International Conference on E-Business Engineering

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“…This inspection may be performed by using any kind of imaging techniques or by using destructive means such as abrasion, chemical etching or focused ion beam. Combinaison of those three techniques have also been proposed [7,36].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Smart security management in secure devices

Robisson

Agoyan

Soquet³

et al. 2016

J Cryptogr Eng

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Abstract. Among other threats, secure components are subjected to physical attacks whose aim is to recover the secret information they store. Most of the work carried out to protect these components generally consists in developing protections (or countermeasures) taken one by one. But this "countermeasure-centered" approach drastically decreases the performance of the chip in terms of power, speed and availability. In order to overcome this limitation, we propose a complementary approach: smart dynamic management of the whole set of countermeasures embedded in the component. Two main specifications for such management are required in a real world application (for example, a conditional access system for Pay-TV): it has to provide capabilities for the chip to distinguish between attacks and normal use cases (without the help of a human being and in a robust but versatile way); it also has to be based on mechanisms which dynamically find a trade-off between security and performance. In this article, a prototype which enables such security management is described. The solution is based on a double-processor architecture: one processor embeds a representative set of countermeasures (and mechanisms to define their parameters) and executes the application code. The second processor, on the same chip, applies a given security strategy, but without requesting sensitive data from the first processor. The chosen strategy is based on fuzzy logic reasoning to enable the designer to describe, using a fairly simple formalism, both the attack paths and the normal use cases. A proof of concept has been proposed for the smart card part of a conditional access for Pay-TV, but it could easily be fine-tuned for other applications.

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“…Their goal is to alter the correct progress of the algorithm and, by analyzing the deviation of the corrupted behavior with respect to the original one, to retrieve the secret information [14]. For java card, fault attacks target particular components of the virtual machine [3,4,9].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Software Countermeasures for Control Flow Integrity of Smart Card C Codes

Lalande

Heydemann

Berthomé

2014

Computer Security - ESORICS 2014

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Abstract. Fault attacks can target smart card programs in order to disrupt an execution and gain an advantage over the data or the embedded functionalities. Among all possible attacks, control flow attacks aim at disrupting the normal execution flow. Identifying harmful control flow attacks as well as designing countermeasures at software level are tedious and tricky for developers. In this paper, we propose a methodology to detect harmful intra-procedural jump attacks at source code level and to automatically inject formally-proven countermeasures. The proposed software countermeasures defeat 100% of attacks that jump over at least two C source code statements or beyond. Experiments show that the resulting code is also hardened against unexpected function calls and jump attacks at assembly level.Keywords: control flow integrity, fault attacks, smart card, source level IntroductionSmart cards or more generally secure elements are essential building blocks for many security-critical applications. They are used for securing host applications and sensitive data such as cryptographic keys, biometric data, pin counters, etc. Malicious users aim to get access to these secrets by performing attacks on the secure elements. Fault attacks consists in disrupting the circuit's behavior by using a laser beam or applying voltage, clock or electromagnetic glitches [5,6,24]. Their goal is to alter the correct progress of the algorithm and, by analyzing the deviation of the corrupted behavior with respect to the original one, to retrieve the secret information [14]. For java card, fault attacks target particular components of the virtual machine [3,4,9].Many protections have therefore been proposed to counteract attacks. Fault detection is generally based on spatial, temporal or information redundancy at hardware or software level. In java card enabled smart cards, software components of the virtual machine can perform security checks [18,20,10].In practice, developers of security-critical applications often manually add countermeasures into an application code. This operation requires knowledge about the target code vulnerabilities. Both these tasks are time-consuming with direct impact on the certification of the product. One harmful consequence of fault attacks is control flow disruption which may bypass some implemented countermeasures. It is difficult for programmers to investigate all possible control flow disruption in order to detect sensitive parts of the code and then investigate how to add countermeasures inside these sensitive parts. Moreover, secure smart cards have strong security requirements that have to be certified by an independent qualified entity before being placed on the market. Certification can rely on a review of source code and the implemented software countermeasures. The effectiveness of software security countermeasures is then guaranteed by the use of a certified compiler [21]. Injecting control flow integrity checks at compile time would require to certify the modified compiler. To avoid this diff...

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Attacks on Java Card 3.0 Combining Fault and Logical Attacks

Cited by 59 publications

References 8 publications

User Centric Security Model for Tamper-Resistant Devices

User Centric Security Model for Tamper-Resistant Devices

Smart security management in secure devices

Software Countermeasures for Control Flow Integrity of Smart Card C Codes

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