IEEE GLOBECOM 2007-2007 IEEE Global Telecommunications Conference 2007
DOI: 10.1109/glocom.2007.193
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Attacks on Sensing in Hostile Wireless Sensor-Actuator Environments

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Cited by 16 publications
(9 citation statements)
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“…2) Malicious Sensor Network: In the second case, we assume the intruder has first randomly deployed a malicious WSN inside the monitored area as in [2], to disturb the observations of neighboring sensor nodes. Therefore, the compromised sensor nodes are initialized at the beginning of the experiments and then they continuously misbehave in order to better serve the intruder.…”
Section: Simulation Resultsmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…2) Malicious Sensor Network: In the second case, we assume the intruder has first randomly deployed a malicious WSN inside the monitored area as in [2], to disturb the observations of neighboring sensor nodes. Therefore, the compromised sensor nodes are initialized at the beginning of the experiments and then they continuously misbehave in order to better serve the intruder.…”
Section: Simulation Resultsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…A possible attacker strategy would be to tamper with sensors away from the attacker's true position to become falsely alarmed and prevent sensors close to the attacker from reporting detection. For instance in [2], the authors present a scenario with malicious actuator nodes deployed to perturb or distort the readings of neighboring sensor nodes within their actuation radius. Another possible attacker strategy would be to deploy various decoys inside the monitored area to cause confusion through a series of false alarms [3].…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Alternatively, in a sophisticated attack scenario, the attacker may have compromised a number of sensors or deployed a malicious sensor network, so that several sensors deliberately reverse their original output to prevent intruder detection [9]. In this case, faulty sensors that fall inside the ROI of the source become non-alarmed; these are denoted as false negatives and shown as light gray circles in Fig.…”
Section: B Fault Modelmentioning
confidence: 96%
“…Whereas coded wireless transmission and decoding might produce a bit error with probability between 10 −6 to 10 −9 , the erroneous reporting rate of a particular scalar-sensor is not as easy to ascertain. Depending on the conditions of the harsh or hostile environment, we might expect a probability of sensor error that changes largely over time and over a wide range of values [5]. Furthermore, whereas we may be able to estimate the probability of sensor error due to harsh conditions, such estimation may not be possible in the case of an attacker who changes the attack statistics to avoid detection [5].…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 93%
“…Depending on the conditions of the harsh or hostile environment, we might expect a probability of sensor error that changes largely over time and over a wide range of values [5]. Furthermore, whereas we may be able to estimate the probability of sensor error due to harsh conditions, such estimation may not be possible in the case of an attacker who changes the attack statistics to avoid detection [5]. Hence whether deployed in normal, harsh or hostile conditions, it is imperative to prevent and detect errors in scalar-reporting in order to achieve a reliable event-driven wVSN operation.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%