Attentive Visual Reference

Green, E. J.

doi:10.1111/mila.12131

Cited by 5 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 79 publications

(73 reference statements)

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“…Much more would need to be said here, of course. Alternatively, Green (2017) proposes weakening the application of discrimination conditions in the face of such cases: "to visually refer to an object that does not occupy one's entire field of vision, it is necessary to circumscribe that object" (29-30, n. 42).…”

Section: Chameleonmentioning

confidence: 99%

Perceptual capacitism: an argument for disjunctive disunity

Openshaw

Weksler

2022

Philos Stud

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According to capacitism, to perceive is to employ personal-level, perceptual capacities. In a series of publications, Schellenberg (2016, 2018, 2019b, 2020) has argued that capacitism offers unified analyses of perceptual particularity, perceptual content, perceptual consciousness, perceptual evidence, and perceptual knowledge. "Capacities first" (2020: 715); appealing accounts of an impressive array of perceptual and epistemological phenomena will follow.We argue that, given the Schellenbergian way of individuating perceptual capacities which underpins the above analyses, perceiving an object does not require employing a perceptual capacity which picks it out. Although each eye, used on its own, can suffice for perceiving objects in one's environment, binocular vision allows one to see the same object(s) via both eyes, taking advantage of informational disparities registered by each eye. Yet in certain conditions it is possible to simultaneously see one object via the left eye and a distinct object via the right eye (at least when the inputs are sufficiently similar to prevent the onset of binocular rivalry). We argue that capacitism has trouble making sense of this. After surveying responses, we conclude that not all of the above phenomena can be unified under the capacitist framework. We then present a more nuanced, disjunctivist account of how capacities are individuated. While it may be illuminating to think of perceiving as the employment of perceptual capacities, this picture does not best favour a 'common factor' theory of perceptual content in the way existing presentations have envisaged.

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Section: Chameleonmentioning

confidence: 99%

Perceptual capacitism: an argument for disjunctive disunity

Openshaw

Weksler

2022

Philos Stud

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“…We can distinguish the features used to pick out an object in the first place from the features used to determine how the object persists over time. Green (2017) argues, for instance, that attribution of structural shape properties sets constraints on reference locking, since it is needed to distinguish perceptual reference to parts from perceptual reference to whole bodies. However, this view does not entail that shape information is always used in reference maintenance.…”

Section: Transsaccadic Memorymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The locking of reference to an object occurs “through a brute causal mechanism” (Pylyshyn 2009, 269), such that the properties to which the mechanism is sensitive need not “be encoded and entered into an object file in order for an index to be captured or an object file to be created” (Pylyshyn 2007, 81; emphasis his; cf. Green 2017).…”

Section: Three Models Of the Perceptual Reference‐attribution Relationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…More technically, it seems that perceptual representation comprises at least two aspects: reference to perceptible individuals, and attribution of properties to those individuals. The distinction between perceptual reference and perceptual attribution is widely accepted in philosophy (Smith 2002;Clark 2004;Cohen 2004;Burge 2010a;Green 2017;Rescorla 2018;Millar forthcoming;Lande unpublished;cf. Fodor 2007;Schellenberg 2018, 67-68; and psychology (Treisman & Gelade 1980;Kahneman et al 1992;Scholl & Leslie 1999;Pylyshyn 2007;cf.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Perceptual attribution and perceptual reference

Quilty‐Dunn

Green

2021

Philos Phenomenol Research

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Perceptual representations pick out individuals and attribute properties to them. This paper considers the role of perceptual attribution in determining or guiding perceptual reference to objects. We consider three extant models of the relation between perceptual attribution and perceptual reference--all attribution guides reference, no attribution guides reference, or a privileged subset of attributions guides reference--and argue that empirical evidence undermines all three. We then defend a flexible-attributives model, on which the range of perceptual attributives used to guide reference shifts adaptively with context. This model underscores the remarkable and dynamic intelligence of our perceptual capacities. We elucidate implications of the model for the boundary between perception and propositional thought.

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“…I argued in the previous section that our experiences do differentiate occluded parts of the scene from their background. Following Strawson (1959) and Evans (1982), another commonly proposed requirement is that one be able to “re‐identify” the item of which one is aware or else track it as it moves and changes (Dickie, 2011; Green, 2017). Much has already been made of the attentional capacity to track whole objects as they move behind occluders; but we also have visual capacities to track partial fragments of objects as those fragments move, change, and become visible or hidden.…”

Section: De Re Awareness Of Hidden Partsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Seeing and visual reference

Lande

2021

Philos Phenomenol Research

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Perception is a central means by which we come to represent and be aware of particulars in the world. I argue that an adequate account of perception must distinguish between what one perceives and what one's perceptual experience is of or about. Through capacities for visual completion, one can be visually aware of particular parts of a scene that one nevertheless does not see.Seeing corresponds to a basic, but not exhaustive, way in which one can be visually aware of an item. I discuss how the relation between seeing and visual awareness should be explicated within a representational account of the mind. Visual awareness of an item involves a primitive kind of reference: one is visually aware of an item when one's visual perceptual state succeeds in referring to that particular item and functions to represent it accurately. Seeing, by contrast, requires more than successful visual reference. Seeing depends additionally on meta-semantic facts about how visual reference happens to be fixed. The notions of seeing and of visual reference are both indispensable to an account of perception, but they are to be characterized at different levels of representational explanation.Perception is a central means by which we become aware of the surrounding world. In virtue of my current visual state or experience, I am aware of the size, shape, and color of the desk in front of me. Moreover, one does not simply experience a matrix of properties-sizes, shapes, colors, and whatever else-which the particular objects of the world may or may not possess.

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Attentive Visual Reference

Cited by 5 publications

References 79 publications

Perceptual capacitism: an argument for disjunctive disunity

Perceptual capacitism: an argument for disjunctive disunity

Perceptual attribution and perceptual reference

Seeing and visual reference

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