Attitudes beyond associations: On the role of propositional representations in stimulus evaluation

Houwer, Jan De; Dessel, Pieter Van; Moran, Tal

doi:10.1016/bs.aesp.2019.09.004

Cited by 75 publications

(106 citation statements)

References 132 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…Second, the representations from which implicit evaluations emerge are posited to be propositional rather than associative. That is, they are thought to contain symbols reflecting the way in which two concepts are related to each other, rather than merely the degree of their relatedness, such as Below (Bread, Butter), Wishes (Woman, Be Wealthy), or Causes (Cold, Sneezing) (De Houwer, Van Dessel, & Moran, 2020;Gawronski & Strack, 2004). Moreover, unlike associations, which can be strong or weak, propositions can be true or false.…”

Section: Propositional Accounts Of Implicit Evaluationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Propositional Accounts of Implicit Evaluation: Taking Stock and Looking Ahead

Kurdi

Dunham

2020

Social Cognition

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Associative accounts suggest that implicit (indirectly measured) evaluations are sensitive primarily to co-occurrence information (e.g., pairings of gorges with positive experiences) and are represented associatively (e.g., Gorge–Nice). By contrast, recent propositional accounts have argued that implicit evaluations are also responsive to relational information (e.g., gorges causing vs. preventing ennui) and are represented propositionally (e.g., “I find gorges fascinating”). In a review of 30 empirical papers involving exposure to contradictory co-occurrence information and relational information, we found overwhelming evidence for the latter dominating the updating of implicit evaluations, supporting the propositional perspective. However, unlike explicit evaluations, implicit evaluations seem recalcitrant in the face of relational information that requires retrospective revaluation of already encoded co-occurrence information. These findings may be jointly explained by a “common currency” hypothesis under which implicit evaluations emerge from compressed summary representations, which are sensitive to relational information but are not fully propositional.

show abstract

Section: Propositional Accounts Of Implicit Evaluationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Propositional Accounts of Implicit Evaluation: Taking Stock and Looking Ahead

Kurdi

Dunham

2020

Social Cognition

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Brownstein, 2015Brownstein, , 2018. 17 Mandelbaum (2016) and De Houwer, Van Dessel, and Moran (2020) have been the view's strongest proponents (though see the references in fn. xiv as a broader propositional consensus is emerging).…”

Section: Belief Changementioning

confidence: 99%

The science of belief: A progress report

Porot

Mandelbaum

2020

WIRES Cognitive Science

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The empirical study of belief is emerging at a rapid clip, uniting work from all corners of cognitive science. Reliance on belief in understanding and predicting behavior is widespread. Examples can be found, inter alia, in the placebo, attribution theory, theory of mind, and comparative psychological literatures. Research on belief also provides evidence for robust generalizations, including about how we fix, store, and change our beliefs. Evidence supports the existence of a Spinozan system of belief fixation: one that is automatic and independent of belief rejection. Independent research supports the existence of a system of fragmented belief storage: one that relies on large numbers of causally isolated, context-sensitive stores of belief in memory. Finally, empirical and observational data support at least two systems of belief change. One system adheres, mostly, to epistemological norms of updating; the other, the psychological immune system, functions to guard our most centrally held beliefs from potential inconsistency with newly formed beliefs. Refining our understanding of these systems can shed light on pressing real-world issues, such as how fake news, propaganda, and brainwashing exploit our psychology of belief, and how best to construct our modern informational world.

show abstract

“…Thanks in large part to propositional accounts, empirical research has started probing connections between implicit evaluation and high-level cognition going beyond the passive recording of co-occurrence information, including reasoning about diagnosticity (e.g., Cone & Ferguson, 2015;Cone, Flaharty, & Ferguson, 2019), the reinterpretation of previous evidence (e.g., Mann & Ferguson, 2015), and, crucially for the present purposes, reasoning about relational information (e.g., Zanon, De Houwer, Gast, & Smith, 2014). A comprehensive summary of this literature is beyond the scope of the present paper (for recent reviews see Cone, Mann, & Ferguson, 2017;De Houwer et al, 2020). Instead, we retain a relatively narrow focus on empirical evidence that has investigated the sensitivity of implicit evaluations to relational information in the presence of contradictory co-occurrence information.…”

Section: The Role Of Relational Information In Implicit Evaluationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Propositional accounts of implicit evaluation: Taking stock and looking ahead

Kurdi¹,

Dunham²

2020

Preprint

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Associative accounts suggest that implicit (indirectly measured) evaluations are sensitive primarily to co-occurrence information (e.g., pairings of gorges with positive experiences) and are represented associatively (e.g., GORGE–NICE). By contrast, recent propositional accounts have argued that implicit evaluations are also responsive to relational information (e.g., gorges causing vs. preventing ennui) and are represented propositionally (e.g., “I find gorges fascinating”). In a review of 30 empirical papers involving exposure to contradictory co-occurrence information and relational information, we found overwhelming evidence for the latter dominating the updating of implicit evaluations, supporting the propositional perspective. However, unlike explicit evaluations, implicit evaluations seem recalcitrant in the face of relational information that requires retrospective revaluation of already encoded co-occurrence information. These findings may be jointly explained by a “common currency” hypothesis under which implicit evaluations emerge from compressed summary representations, which are sensitive to relational information but are not fully propositional.

show abstract

Attitudes beyond associations: On the role of propositional representations in stimulus evaluation

Cited by 75 publications

References 132 publications

Propositional Accounts of Implicit Evaluation: Taking Stock and Looking Ahead

Propositional Accounts of Implicit Evaluation: Taking Stock and Looking Ahead

The science of belief: A progress report

Propositional accounts of implicit evaluation: Taking stock and looking ahead

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About