Attitudinal Ambivalence: Moral Uncertainty for Non-Cognitivists

Abstract

In many situations, people are unsure in their moral judgments. In much recent philosophical literature, this kind of moral doubt has been analysed in terms of uncertainty in one's moral beliefs. Non-cognitivists, however, argue that moral judgments express a kind of conative attitude, more akin to a desire than a belief. This paper presents a scientifically informed reconciliation of non-cognitivism and moral doubt. The central claim is that attitudinal ambivalence-the degree to which one holds conflicting attitudes towards the same object-can play the role of moral doubt for non-cognitivists. I will demonstrate that ambivalence has all of the features that we would expect it to have in order to play the role of moral doubt. It is gradable, can vary through time, covaries with strength of motivation, and is suitably distinct from the other features of our moral judgments. As well as providing a defence of non-cognitivism, this insight poses a new challenge for the view-deciding how to act under moral ambivalence.

Uncertain Facts or Uncertain Values? Testing the Distinction Between Empirical and Normative Uncertainty in Moral Judgments

“…Yet, the association between normative uncertainty and correctness was stronger than that between normative uncertainty and clarity. This also counters the view that normative uncertainty is reducible to ambivalence since it suggests that normative uncertainty is associated with a lack of certainty about which moral view is correct, which goes beyond the concept of ambivalence as it is discussed in metaethics (Makins, 2021;Theisen, 2023).…”

“…Item wording: Following our definition of empirical uncertainty, the respective items described being morally uncertain due to a lack of unknown circumstances or unclear consequences (e.g., "The moral evaluation of the action is difficult because some facts are unclear," "It is difficult to judge the action because I do not know what doing or not doing the action would lead to"). Items for normative uncertainty were derived from the philosophical literature on decision-making under normative uncertainty (e.g., MacAskill et al, 2020;Moller, 2011;Nissan-Rozen, 2015) and on the metaethics of normative uncertainty (e.g., Eriksson & Francén Olinder, 2016;Makins, 2021;Robinson & Steele, 2022), including aspects such as uncertainty regarding the right moral view and conflict between opposing moral views (e.g., "I am unsure how to apply my moral concepts to this situation," "I have different moral views that lead to different evaluations of this action"). The items were developed in English.…”

“…All of these approaches share the assumption that normative uncertainty can refer to one moral value by itself. Other approaches understand normative uncertainty as the result of conflict between multiple values, as they usually occur in moral dilemmas (Makins, 2021; Robinson & Steele, 2022). In this paper, we try not to take a stance on metaethical matters.…”

The balance and weight of reasons

“…SeeMakins (2022) for a detailed discussion of this form of ambivalence and how it may be understood as a non-cognitivist variety of moral uncertainty, when the conflicting reasons concern moral considerations.…”

Ambivalence comme pari créatif : réflexions sur un modèle d’édition académique lié au développement

“…Góźdź Joanna, "Wpływ motywacji do nauki na ściąganie w szkole [The Impact of Motivation to Learn on Cheating at School]." Studia Edukacyjne nr57, 202057, , Poznań 2020 NicholasMakins (2021). "Attitudinal Ambivalence: Moral Uncertainty for Non-Cognitivists", Australasian Journal ofPhilosophy, 3-4.…”