Attitudinal control

Abstract

Beliefs are held to norms in a way that seems to require control over what we believe.Yet we don't control our beliefs at will, in the way we control our actions. I argue that this problem can be solved by recognising a different form of control, which we exercise when we revise our beliefs directly for reasons. We enjoy this form of attitudinal control not only over our beliefs, but also over other attitudes, including intentions -that is, over the will itself. Closely tied to our capacity for reasoning, attitudinal control is in important respects more fundamental than the voluntary control that we exercise over our actions. In the course of developing this account I respond to two objections recently raised against an earlier version of it by Anthony Booth (2014).It is widely held that there are prescriptive norms governing belief. On the face of it, this presupposes that we can be responsible for what we believe, and, in turn, that we have some form of control over our beliefs. Yet we do not seem to control our beliefs in the same way that we control our bodily actions. This is the problem of epistemic responsibility.The solution, I argue, lies in recognising a form of attitudinal control, which differs from the voluntary control we exercise over our bodily actions. What is crucial for responsibility to certain norms is the capacity to respond to the reasons associated with those norms. Through attitudinal control we respond to the reasons that bear on our attitudes -attitudes including not only beliefs, but also, notably, intentions. Indeed, this form of control is in important respects more fundamental than voluntary control.In what follows I set out more fully the problem of epistemic responsibility and argue for the solution just sketched. I then take up two objections from Anthony Booth (2014). In responding to them I 2 refine and deepen my account of responsibility, of attitudinal control, and of its relation to the way we control our actions. I argue that these kinds of control can helpfully be understood in terms of the different ways they are exercised through reasoning. The Problem of Epistemic Responsibility and How to Solve It The ProblemThe problem of epistemic responsibility can be expressed through four claims that seem individually plausible but are jointly incompatible. 1 (i) Our beliefs, like our actions, are governed by prescriptive norms. 2(ii) If beliefs are governed by prescriptive norms, then we can be responsible for our beliefs, as we can be for our actions.(iii) Being responsible for our beliefs requires that we have the same kind of control over our beliefs as we do over our actions.(iv) We don't have the same kind of control over our beliefs as we do over our actions.In the rest of this subsection I will clarify these claims and try to bring out their prima facie plausibility.By prescriptive norms I mean norms of the sort that we express using terms like 'ought', 'may', 'must', 'obligation' and 'permission' in their ordinary senses. Such norms require, enjoin, permit or 1 ...

Which Mental States Are Rationally Evaluable, And Why?

“…Scanlon ()), or being in a mental state that is genuinely responsive to reasons (cf . McHugh (), (), and ()), that involves or embodies commitment ( cf . Korsgaard ()), or that amounts to settling a question ( cf .…”

“…If we take this feature of our evaluative practice at face value (as I think we should), then a subject is answerable or appropriately held to account for believing as she does only if her belief admits or could admit of reasons‐for‐which explanation. That S's belief that p admits or could admit of reasons‐for‐which explanation is necessary (but not sufficient, for reasons highlighted in McHugh ()) for evaluation of S's belief with respect to norms of epistemic rationality and justification to carry the kind of prescriptive force that it paradigmatically does.…”

The Consequential Conception of Doxastic Responsibility

“…Then, nothing warrants the use of the phrase “doxastic responsibility”, precisely because “doxastic responsibility” does not refer to a standard form of responsibility, to a form of responsibility that can be found in the non‐attitudinal realm . Philosophers whose account of doxastic responsibility forces them to answer the general question negatively – doxastic compatibilists like, e.g., McHugh (, ) and Hieronymi (, ) – have no other option but to complement these accounts. They have, furthermore, to explain – and this is not unproblematic – why their accounts of doxastic responsibility capture a genuine form of responsibility .…”

“…I have also, previously, emphasized that the consequential conception gives a positive answer to the general question of doxastic analogy. The consequential conception therefore has an advantage that some influential compatibilist accounts of doxastic responsibility (Hieronymi, , ; McHugh, , ) lack: it avoids the objection of ad‐hocness. Indeed, these doxastic compatibilists offer a negative answer to the general question of doxastic analogy.…”

“…There is, therefore, no reason not to favour it over accounts of doxastic responsibility that do not preserve the analogy with the non‐attitudinal realm (e.g. Hieronymi , ; McHugh , ).…”