Attraktivität der Gewaltbeobachtung

Grimm, Jürgen

doi:10.1007/978-3-322-83252-8_9

Cited by 2 publications

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“…147 Moreover, given the historical origins of the eternity clause as a safeguard against the subversion or destruction of the constitutional checks and balances from within, it makes sense to use it in the European context as a means to prevent the political actors from assuming power over decisions that-to the Court-are not theirs to make in the first place. 148 It is therefore consistent for the Court to control these limits in the same way as it reviews compliance with the eternity clause in general. Whether or not the EURO bailout decision is any indication as to the level of scrutiny applied in this context remains to be seen.…”

Section: A the Limits Of Competence Transfermentioning

confidence: 96%

THE CONTINUING MYTH OF EURO-SCEPTICISM? THE GERMAN FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL COURT TWO YEARS AFTER LISBON

Zwingmann

2012

ICLQ

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The German Federal Constitutional Court's 2009 decision on the Lisbon Treaty immediately provoked passionate criticisms and revived the Court's image of the Eurosceptic par excellence. However, if one uses the Court's general case law on the interaction between European law and German constitutional law-in particular the Mangold follow-up (Re Honeywell) and the EURO bailout decision-as a background for analysis, a high level of practical support becomes apparent, that is quite the opposite to the all-out war some commentators predicted. It also illustrates how the Lisbon principles can be used to exert a positive influence on the European integration process.

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Section: A the Limits Of Competence Transfermentioning

confidence: 96%

THE CONTINUING MYTH OF EURO-SCEPTICISM? THE GERMAN FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL COURT TWO YEARS AFTER LISBON

Zwingmann

2012

ICLQ

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“…56 The central fallacy is that this assumes that sovereignty-or individual sovereign powers-is measurable by a commensurable metric that allows comparisons between the Member State and EU levels. 57 Ultimately, Grimm attempts to side step this issue, by arguing that surely the entity that "decides about the allocation of sovereign powers" 58 Little has changed since then and, indeed, the German CC's discussion of sovereignty, at times, reads like a textbook lecture 60 from the Westphalian era of international law. The realities of globalization have, fortunately, long overtaken this antiquated framework and call the enduring relevance of the single nation state into question.…”

Section: Critiquementioning

confidence: 99%

What Red Lines, If Any, Do the Lisbon Judgments of European Constitutional Courts Draw for Future EU Integration?

Theil¹

2014

Ger. law j.

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The lingering European financial crisis continues to threaten the Eurozone and, in the opinion of German Chancellor Angela Merkel, the very survival of the European idea. With this apocalyptic rhetoric, it is easily forgotten that only nine years earlier Europe overcame a predicament that was, at the time, equally described as the most challenging in its history. Two failed referendums in Member States of the European Union (Member States)—namely, in France and the Netherlands—stopped the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (Constitutional Treaty) in its tracks and led to an extended “period of reflection” for Europe's leaders. From this emerged a reboot of the Constitutional Treaty, now dubbed the Treaty of Lisbon, with few substantial changes, but more success throughout the ratification procedures. The final hurdle presented itself in the form of institutionally strong Constitutional Courts (CC) and Tribunals (CT) of the European Member States. Of these, the following were at one time or another seized with complaints against the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty: The AustrianVerfassungsgerichtshof(Austrian CC), the Belgian CC, theÚstavní soud České republiky(Czech CC), the FrenchConseil Constitutionnel(French CC), the GermanBundesverfassungsgericht(German CC), the Hungarian CC, theLatvijas Republikas Satversmes tiesa(Latvian CC), the PolishTrybunał Konstytucyjny(Polish CT), and theTribunal Constitucional de España(Spanish CT).

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Attraktivität der Gewaltbeobachtung

Cited by 2 publications

References 0 publications

THE CONTINUING MYTH OF EURO-SCEPTICISM? THE GERMAN FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL COURT TWO YEARS AFTER LISBON

THE CONTINUING MYTH OF EURO-SCEPTICISM? THE GERMAN FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL COURT TWO YEARS AFTER LISBON

What Red Lines, If Any, Do the Lisbon Judgments of European Constitutional Courts Draw for Future EU Integration?

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