Attributability, Answerability, and Accountability: Toward a Wider Theory of Moral Responsibility

Shoemaker, David

doi:10.1086/659003

Cited by 199 publications

(106 citation statements)

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“…To begin, it is important to distinguish between three distinct conceptions of responsibility that have been identified in the literature: accountability, attributability, and answerability (see, e.g., Watson 1996;Shoemaker 2011;Eshleman 2014).…”

Section: Accountability Attributability and Answerabilitymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…As Gary Watson has highlighted, the central concern in such views is whether the agent's action or attitude discloses her evaluative judgments or commitments (1996; see also Eshleman 2014). Since attributability makes no appeal to basic desert or backwardlooking praise and blame, it remains independent of accountability (see Shoemaker 2011;Watson 1996). As Andrew Eshleman explains, Satisfying some baseline conditions of responsibility as attributability would appear to be necessary in order to be responsible in the sense of accountable.…”

Section: Accountability Attributability and Answerabilitymentioning

confidence: 99%

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Free Will Skepticism and the Question of Creativity: Creativity, Desert, and Self-Creation

Caruso

2017

SSRN Journal

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Section: Accountability Attributability and Answerabilitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Accountability Attributability and Answerabilitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Free Will Skepticism and the Question of Creativity: Creativity, Desert, and Self-Creation

Caruso

2017

SSRN Journal

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“…This judgment, according to Talbert, represents a kind of malice or contempt towards others, which is sufficient for ill-will; thus psychopaths satisfy this requirement for blameworthiness. neil levy (2007), David Shoemaker (2011), andDana nelkin (2015) argue that psychopaths cannot express ill-will. Though their arguments differ in their details, all appeal to psychopaths' inability to appreciate the moral significance of their actions.…”

Section: Psychopaths and Ill-willmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…levy, are required for the expression of ill-will. Shoemaker (2011) argues along similar lines-because psychopaths are not aware that other beings are entitled to moral consideration, they cannot show genuine contempt for them when they act. While psychopaths may fail to respect their victims, Shoemaker writes, they cannot disrespect them, and the latter is required for ill-will.…”

Section: Psychopaths and Ill-willmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…14 even when the demand question is raised in the context of the ill-will debate, it is sometimes unclear how or even whether it is meant to be connected to ill-will. levy (2007) and Shoemaker (2011) argue that psychopaths are not apt targets for moral demands, on the grounds that they cannot respond to moral considerations and thus cannot be swayed by moral discourse. Talbert (2008) argues that they are apt targets for moral demands, noting that the aptness of a demand need not depend on whether the recipient is likely to respond to it; demands might serve a variety of purposes apart from changing the behavior of those to whom they are directed.…”

Section: Psychopaths and Ill-willmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Psychopaths, Ill-Will, and the Wrong-Making Features of Actions

Clancy¹

2017

Ergo, an Open Access Journal of Philosophy

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Many recent discussions of psychopaths have centered on the question of whether they can express ill-will when they act, a capacity which is generally taken to be required for moral blameworthiness. However, the debate over ill-will currently stands at an impasse; the participants are in substantial agreement as to which attitudes psychopaths can express, but disagree as to which attitudes count as ill-will. I argue that this impasse reflects an underlying, implicit disagreement as to which features of actions are wrong-making. By uncovering this implicit disagreement and addressing it head-on, we should be able to break the impasse. IntroductionAre psychopaths morally blameworthy for their bad actions? Many recent treatments of this question have focused on psychopaths' capacity, or lack thereof, to express ill-will by acting. Psychopaths apparently understand that others can be harmed, and thus their actions can express the judgment that the harm they inflict on others is unimportant. But psychopaths apparently do not understand that others have moral standing, and thus their actions cannot express contempt for other persons qua moral patients. While the parties to the ill-will debate agree as to which attitudes psychopaths can express, they disagree as to which attitudes count as ill-will. The debate seems to have reached an impasse.I argue here that this impasse is due in large part to an implicit disagreement as to which features of actions are wrong-making. Ill-will is best understood, I contend, as an objectionable attitude towards one or more of the features of actions which make them wrong. As I hope to show, the question of precisely which features make actions wrong is more difficult than has previously been appreciated. even when a given set of normative assumptions is shared, it is This, I contend, is a major cause of the disagreement over the ill-will question. The expression of ill-will requires awareness of the wrong-making features, and psychopaths are aware of some features but not others. Some parties implicitly identify the wrong-making features as those of which the psychopath is aware-such as the harmfulness of his actions-and conclude that he does express ill-will. Others implicitly identify the wrong-making features as those of which the psychopath is not aware-such as the fact that he harms persons with moral standing-and conclude that he does not express ill-will. This underlying disagreement explains why the ill-will question has reached its current impasse; exposing the disagreement reveals a way in which the impasse can be broken.In Section 2, I provide an overview of the ill-will question and the surrounding impasse. In Section 3, I offer my diagnosis-our disagreement about whether psychopaths can express ill-will reflects an underlying disagreement as to which features of actions are wrong-making. In Section 4, I discuss the prospects for resolving this underlying disagreement and breaking the impasse. Psychopaths and Ill-WillThe empirical details of psychopathy are the subject of ...

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The Future of the Causal Quest

Tierney¹

2023

A Companion to Free Will

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Attributability, Answerability, and Accountability: Toward a Wider Theory of Moral Responsibility

Cited by 199 publications

References 7 publications

Free Will Skepticism and the Question of Creativity: Creativity, Desert, and Self-Creation

Free Will Skepticism and the Question of Creativity: Creativity, Desert, and Self-Creation

Psychopaths, Ill-Will, and the Wrong-Making Features of Actions

The Future of the Causal Quest

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