2021
DOI: 10.1108/cg-02-2021-0066
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Attributes of corporate boards and assurance of corporate social responsibility reporting: evidence from the UK

Abstract: Purpose This study aims to investigate the relationship between the attributes of corporate boards in UK companies and their tendency to assure their corporate social responsibility (CSR) reports. Design/methodology/approach From the agency theory perspective, the authors examine the impact of board attributes on the assurance of CSR reports for the Financial Times Stock Exchange (FTSE) 350 during 2016–2019. The authors used annual integrated reports, companies’ websites and Thomson Reuters Eikon database fo… Show more

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Cited by 42 publications
(51 citation statements)
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References 119 publications
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“…This included France (Dakhli, 2021;Beji et al, 2021), Germany (Dienes and Velte, 2016), Italy (Provasi and Harasheh, 2021;Harjoto and Rossi, 2019) and Spain (Pucheta-Martinez et al, 2020 (gender diversity as institutional directors); Bravo and Reguera-Alvarado, 2019 (audit committee gender); Martinez et al, 2019;Pucheta-Martinez et al, 2019a;2019b (independent female directors); Cabeza-Garcia et al, 2018;Fuente et al, 2017;Garcia-Torea et al, 2017;Larrieta-Rubín de Celis et al, 2015) as mandatory regimes. The voluntary UK setting shows similar results (Jizi, 2017;Al-Shaer and Zaman, 2016;Arayssi et al, 2016;Shaukat et al, 2016;Aladwey et al (2021)…”
Section: (Italy)mentioning
confidence: 58%
“…This included France (Dakhli, 2021;Beji et al, 2021), Germany (Dienes and Velte, 2016), Italy (Provasi and Harasheh, 2021;Harjoto and Rossi, 2019) and Spain (Pucheta-Martinez et al, 2020 (gender diversity as institutional directors); Bravo and Reguera-Alvarado, 2019 (audit committee gender); Martinez et al, 2019;Pucheta-Martinez et al, 2019a;2019b (independent female directors); Cabeza-Garcia et al, 2018;Fuente et al, 2017;Garcia-Torea et al, 2017;Larrieta-Rubín de Celis et al, 2015) as mandatory regimes. The voluntary UK setting shows similar results (Jizi, 2017;Al-Shaer and Zaman, 2016;Arayssi et al, 2016;Shaukat et al, 2016;Aladwey et al (2021)…”
Section: (Italy)mentioning
confidence: 58%
“…This result is consistent with recent studies, according to which gender diversity among the board has a positive influence on the quality of reporting on GHG emissions and the risks of CC (Ben-Amar et al , 2017). According to such studies, females are more focused on stakeholders than males and more inclined to combine the interests of the various parties with those of the stakeholders (Aladwey et al , 2021; Jouber, 2021). Gender diversity can therefore, it is argued, guarantee a greater sensitivity to ethical issues (Tingbani et al , 2020).…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The relationship between corporate governance and ESG disclosure is not a new topic among accounting scholars (Aladwey et al , 2021; Khan et al , 2019). Recent studies have focused on the relationship between corporate governance and CC or carbon disclosure (Chithambo and Tauringana, 2017; Velte et al , 2020).…”
Section: Theoretical Background and Hypothesesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The independent variables of this study are: board size (BSIZE), calculated as the number of directors on the board (Assenga et al , 2018; Vairavan and Zhang, 2020; Vitolla et al , 2020b; Aladwey et al , 2021; Khan, 2022); board gender diversity (BGD), calculated as the percentage of female directors on the board (Assenga et al , 2018; Vitolla et al , 2020b; García-Sánchez et al , 2021b); board independence (BIND), calculated as the percentage of non-executive directors with the board (Vitolla et al , 2020b; Aladwey et al , 2021); and board meeting frequency (BMF), calculated as the number of annual meetings of the board (Vitolla et al , 2020b).…”
Section: Methodsmentioning
confidence: 99%