Attribution of Dispositional States by 12-Month-Olds

Abstract

The ability to interpret the behavior of other individuals is essential for effective social functioning. Many investigators now believe that even young infants can recognize that agents act toward goals. Here we report three experiments suggesting that 12-month-old infants not only can recognize goal-related action, but also can interpret future actions of an actor on the basis of previously witnessed behavior in another context. The possibility that this inference is made through the attribution of mental states is discussed.

Can infants attribute to an agent a disposition to perform a particular action?

“…First, they suggest that, by 13.5 months of age, infants can attribute to agents not only dispositions involving particular agents and objects (e.g., Kuhlmeier et al, 2003;Luo & Baillargeon, 2005, in press;Onishi & Baillargeon, 2002;Premack & Premack, 1997;Song et al, 2005), but also dispositions involving particular actions. The infants in the present research attributed to the actor an inclination to slide or lift objects, and they used this disposition to predict, when new objects were introduced in test, which object the actor would select (and hence which goal-directed actions the actor would perform to obtain that object).…”

“…These findings, together with those cited above, raise many interesting questions for future research. For example, are these dispositions best understood as primitive mental states or as behavioral tendencies (for discussion, see Kuhlmeier et al, 2003)? What kinds of positive and negative dispositions are infants of different ages able to attribute to agents?…”

“…Although at an abstract level goals and dispositions are conceptually distinct-for example, we would not want to say that a fondness for pecan pie is equivalent to a goal of eating pecan pie-at a more concrete level goals and dispositions are clearly intertwined: her fondness for pecan pie should lead our friend, once she reaches the buffet table and notices the pecan pie, to form a goal of obtaining a piece of the pie and to act in a manner consistent with this goal. In this sense, recognizing others' dispositions can thus help us make sense of their goal-directed actions.Recent research suggests that infants attribute not only goals (e.g., Csibra, Bíró, Koós, & Gergely, 2003;Csibra, Gergely, Bíró, Koós, & Brockbank, 1999;Gergely, Bekkering, & Kiraly, 2002;Gergely, Nadasdy, Csibra, & Biro, 1995;Meltzoff, 1995Meltzoff, , 1996Onishi, Baillargeon, & Woodward, 2005;Shimizu & Johnson, 2004;Song, Baillargeon, & Fisher, 2005;Thoermer & Sodian, 2001;Woodward, 1998Woodward, , 1999 but also dispositions (e.g., Kuhlmeier, Wynn, & Bloom, 2003; Luo & Baillargeon, 2005, in press;Onishi & Baillargeon, 2002;Premack & Premack, 1997;Song, et al, 2005) …”

The motor theory of social cognition: a critique

“…There is also evidence that 3-4-year-old toddlers respond like adults to the perception of Heider and Simmel type of stimuli [35]. Recently, when showed a triangle and a square whose motions were automatically seen respectively as 'helping' and as 'hindering' a circle move up a slope, 12-month-old infants exhibited a clear preference for the former over the latter [36].…”

“…By contrast, geometrical stimuli form a homogeneous class of entities. Seeing geometrical stimuli move in relation to one another causes in humans a 'perceptual social illusion', that is, an illusion of social interactions guided by social intentions [33][34][35][36]. But given that the motion of geometrical stimuli is non-biological, it follows that the process whereby social intentions are represented and ascribed cannot be by matching the observed motions onto one's own motor repertoire, that is, by simulation in the narrow sense.…”