2020
DOI: 10.1016/j.compeleceng.2020.106734
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Auction based game theory in cognitive radio networks for dynamic spectrum allocation

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Cited by 22 publications
(12 citation statements)
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“…We remark that for the smallest number of SUs, the performance of [19] is better than ours; but for the higher number, our results exceed those of [19]. This phenomenon can be explained by the increase in overall profit, when the number of cooperated SUs increases, and will be the same for the PU.…”
Section: B Pu's Performancecontrasting
confidence: 67%
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“…We remark that for the smallest number of SUs, the performance of [19] is better than ours; but for the higher number, our results exceed those of [19]. This phenomenon can be explained by the increase in overall profit, when the number of cooperated SUs increases, and will be the same for the PU.…”
Section: B Pu's Performancecontrasting
confidence: 67%
“…But neither cooperation nor competition is extremely positive or negative: each has its advantages and its limits [11]- [17]. Auction mechanism approach helps the SUs to get a part of the unused license band, for a lease, from the PUs [19,20]. The authors of [19] proposed a new framwork, based on the negligible mutual interferences and satisfaction levels among the SUs, to share the leased band.…”
Section: Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…An auction methodology reported in Sumithra Sofia and Shirly Edward 19 considers interference constraints for enhanced spectrum utilization. The presented game theory‐based auction model selects the winner considering the satisfaction level and interference constraints to overcome the limitations in traditional auction mechanisms like a second‐price auction and Vickrey–Clarke–Groves auction models.…”
Section: Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%