Auctioning Bus Routes: The London Experience

Cantillon, Estelle; Pesendorfer, Martin

doi:10.7551/mitpress/9780262033428.003.0023

Cited by 72 publications

(66 citation statements)

References 6 publications

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“…These include, amongst others, industrial procurement [47], manufacturing and scheduling [74,92,97], public transport [16], the fair and efficient exploitation of jointly funded Earth Observation Satellites [61,62], airport traffic management [54], crisis management [64], network routing [40], and the timely allocation of resources in grid architectures [51].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Multiagent resource allocation

Chevaleyre

Dunne

Endriss

et al. 2005

The Knowledge Engineering Review

192

294

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The allocation of resources within a system of autonomous agents, that not only have preferences over alternative allocations of resources but also actively participate in computing an allocation, is an exciting area of research at the interface of Computer Science and Economics. This paper is a survey of some of the most salient issues in Multiagent Resource Allocation. In particular, we review various languages to represent the preferences of agents over alternative allocations of resources as well as different measures of social welfare to assess the overall quality of an allocation. We also discuss pertinent issues regarding allocation procedures and present important complexity results. Our presentation of theoretical issues is complemented by a discussion of software packages for the simulation of agent-based market places. We also introduce four major application areas for Multiagent Resource Allocation, namely industrial procurement, sharing of satellite resources, manufacturing control, and grid computing.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Multiagent resource allocation

Chevaleyre

Dunne

Endriss

et al. 2005

The Knowledge Engineering Review

192

294

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…This problem, described in the literature as the Winner Determination Problem (WDP), is an NP-hard, combinatorial optimization problem (Sandholm, Suri, Gilpin, and Levine 2002). In the literature there is as yet only a fairly limited number of papers that address a WDP in the context of the procurement of transport services (Cantillon and Pesendorfer 2006;Sheffi 2006, 2003;Elmaghraby and Keskinocak 2004;Ledyard, Olson, Porter, Swanson, and Torma 2002;Song and Regan 2003;Buer and Pankratz 2010). Nevertheless, in the recent past combinatorial auctions have already been applied in shipping with success.…”

Section: Combinatorial Auctions For Transportation Procurementmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Because of the complex time/space interdependencies between transport contracts, the transport domain is considered to be a classic application area of combinatorial auctions (Cantillon and Pesendorfer 2006;Fischer, Müller, Pischel, and Schier 1995;Gomber, Schmidt, and Weinhardt 1997;Kopfer and Pankratz 1999;Pankratz 2000;Sandholm 1993). In comparison to simple auctions, the assignment of contracts to carriers in combinatorial auctions is, however, clearly more difficult.…”

Section: Combinatorial Auctions For Transportation Procurementmentioning

confidence: 99%

GRASP with Hybrid Path Relinking for Bi-Objective Winner Determination in Combinatorial Transportation Auctions

Buer

Pankratz

2010

Bus Res

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in

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“…Actual or potential uses of combinatorial actions include auctions for provision of transportation services (Caplice andSheffi 2006, Cantillon andPesendorfer 2006) industrial procurement (Bicheler et al 2006), arrival and departure times at airports (Rassenti et al 1982), natural gas pipeline networks (Rassenti et al 1994), and use of radio spectrum (Milgrom 2000). Complementarities are often important in combinatorial auctions.…”

Section: Combinatorial Auctionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Optimal shill bidding in the VCG mechanism

Sher

2010

Econ Theory

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This paper studies shill bidding in the VCG mechanism applied to combinatorial auctions. Shill bidding is a strategy whereby a single decision-maker enters the auction under the guise of multiple identities (Sakurai et al. 1999). I formulate the problem of optimal shill bidding for a bidder who knows the aggregate bid of her opponents. A key to the analysis is a subproblem-the cost minimization problem (CMP)-which searches for the cheapest way to win a given package using shills. An analysis of the CMP leads to several fundamental results about shill bidding: (i) I provide an exact characterization of the aggregate bids b such that some bidder would have an incentive to shill bid against b in terms of a new property Submodularity at the Top; (ii) the problem of optimally sponsoring shills is equivalent to the winner determination problem (for single minded bidders)-the problem of finding an efficient allocation in a combinatorial auction; (iii) shill bidding can occur in equilibrium; and (iv) the problem of shill bidding has an inverse, namely the collusive problem that a coalition of bidders may have an incentive to merge (even after competition among coalition members has been suppressed). I show that only when valuations are additive can the incentives to shill and merge simultaneously disappear. JEL Classification: C72, D44

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Auctioning Bus Routes: The London Experience

Cited by 72 publications

References 6 publications

Multiagent resource allocation

Multiagent resource allocation

GRASP with Hybrid Path Relinking for Bi-Objective Winner Determination in Combinatorial Transportation Auctions

Optimal shill bidding in the VCG mechanism

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