Auctions for quota: A primer and perspectives for the future

Marszalec, Daniel

doi:10.1016/j.fishres.2017.07.017

Cited by 10 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 17 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Yet, the allocation of catch shares has always been a challenging policy problem (Rosenberg 2017, Lynham 2014). There is an active discussion about market-based solutions for the allocation and re-allocation of catch shares (Marszalec 2017, Kominers et al 2017. Unfortunately, the design of such markets is challenging as complex constraints need to be considered in practice.…”

Section: Exchanges For Fishery Access Rightsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Core Pricing in Combinatorial Exchanges with Financially Constrained Buyers: Computational Hardness and Algorithmic Solutions

Bichler

Waldherr

2022

Operations Research

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The computation of market equilibria is a fundamental and practically relevant problem. Although we know the computational complexity and the types of price functions necessary for combinatorial exchanges with quasilinear preferences, the respective literature does not consider financially constrained buyers. We show that computing market outcomes that respect budget constraints but are core stable is a problem in the second level of the polynomial hierarchy. Problems in this complexity class are rare, but ignoring budget constraints can lead to significant efficiency losses and instability. We introduce mixed integer bilevel linear programs (MIBLP) to compute core-stable market outcomes and provide effective column and constraint generation algorithms to solve these problems. Although full core stability quickly becomes intractable, we show that realistic problem sizes can actually be solved if the designer limits attention to deviations of small coalitions. This n-coalition stability is a practical approach to tame the computational complexity of the general problem and at the same time provides a reasonable level of stability for markets in the field where buyers have budget constraints.

show abstract

Section: Exchanges For Fishery Access Rightsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Core Pricing in Combinatorial Exchanges with Financially Constrained Buyers: Computational Hardness and Algorithmic Solutions

Bichler

Waldherr

2022

Operations Research

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…AB or ABC) in order for the auctions to allocate quota efficiently (Porter et al, 2003;Kwasnica et al, 2005;Cramton et al, 2006;Brunner et al, 2010). 11 For example, Marszalec (2018a) discusses how different types of sealed-bid combinatorial auctions for indivisible goods could be applied to sell ITQs. 12 But since quota is, in principle, divisible, an alternative approach is to allow bidders to bid for combinatorial shares (Wilson, 1979;Klemperer, 2010).…”

Section: (I) Allocation Of Itqsmentioning

confidence: 99%