2017
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.01.003
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Auctions vs. fixed pricing: Competing for budget constrained buyers

Abstract: Available online xxxx JEL classification: C78 D4 D83We investigate price mechanism selection in a setting where sellers compete for budget constrained buyers by adopting either fixed pricing or auctions (first or second price). We show that first and second price auctions are payoff equivalent when some bidders are financially constrained, so sellers are indifferent to adopt either format. We characterize possible equilibria and show that if the budget is high, then sellers compete via fixed pricing, if it is … Show more

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Cited by 5 publications
(3 citation statements)
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“…The possibility for a seller to use different selling mechanisms in online markets has provoked interdisciplinary interest to determine which mix of mechanisms is efficient and optimal and to provide rationale for the observed patterns. For example, Chen et al (2017) argue that the choice of a selling mechanism may be attributed to the seller's time preference, while Selcuk (2017) suggests that such a decision is rooted in the buyers' budget constraints.…”
Section: Related Literaturementioning
confidence: 99%
“…The possibility for a seller to use different selling mechanisms in online markets has provoked interdisciplinary interest to determine which mix of mechanisms is efficient and optimal and to provide rationale for the observed patterns. For example, Chen et al (2017) argue that the choice of a selling mechanism may be attributed to the seller's time preference, while Selcuk (2017) suggests that such a decision is rooted in the buyers' budget constraints.…”
Section: Related Literaturementioning
confidence: 99%
“…Experimental results suggest that Internet auctions require a few more participants and more time to achieve operational efficiency levels than centralized markets. Selcuk [4] investigates price mechanism selection and characterizes a possible equilibrium. Greenstein-Messica [5] introduces a novel approach for a personal price aware multi-seller recommender system (PMSRS), which could improve recommendation systems' prediction accuracy.…”
Section: Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In these industries, the market outcome is not only driven by the omnipotent power of overall supply and demand, but also the revenue-seeking behaviors of individual sellers. Seller competition is an ongoing topic in the literature of game theory, from the classic models of competition on the basis of prices and production quantities (see, e.g., Chapter 6 of the book by Dixon [2017]), to the more complex ones like the model by Selcuk [2017] and Paes Leme et al [2020] where sellers compete for buyers' money through selecting suitable trading mechanisms.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%