Audit Committees and Voluntary External Auditor Involvement in UK Interim Reporting

Mangena, Musa; Tauringana, Venancio

doi:10.1111/j.1099-1123.2008.00369.x

Cited by 65 publications

(67 citation statements)

References 49 publications

(203 reference statements)

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“…Jensen and Meckling (1978) in particular suggested that firms may mainly focus on "relevant stakeholders." Arguably, to the extent that various firm-level decisions are greatly influenced by the characteristics of the CEO (Hambrick & Mason, 1984;Sterling, 2014), shareholders (Haniffa & Cooke, 2002;Mangena & Tauringana, 2008), and the board (Forker, 1992;Tricker, 1984), these will influence the choice of relevant stakeholders when firms are making disclosure-related decisions. For example, in continental Europe where countries have a two-tier board structure, a stakeholder may be relevant to the extent that they are represented on the supervisory board.…”

Section: Theoretical Frameworkmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…For example, foreign investors who are far from firms may demand higher levels of CG disclosures that protect shareholder interests (Bokpin & Isshaq, 2009;Haniffa & Cooke, 2002;Mangena & Tauringana, 2008;Singhvi, 1968). First, chief executive officer (CEO), ownership, and board characteristics may influence firms to be shareholder focused or consider other nonshareholding stakeholders when making CG disclosure decisions.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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The simultaneous disclosure of shareholder and stakeholder corporate governance practices and their antecedents

Gyapong

Afrifa

2018

Int. J Fin Econ

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In making corporate governance (CG)‐related disclosure, firms may solely focus on shareholders or may broaden their scope of disclosure to serve other stakeholders as well. This study examines whether there are differences in the disclosure of shareholder and stakeholder CG practices. Based on a hand‐collected dataset of 1,110 firm years in South Africa and a disclosure index using 72 CG provisions from the King III report of CG, we find that the disclosure of stakeholder CG practices is higher than that of shareholder CG practices. Our evidence suggests that foreign ownership, institutional ownership, racial diversity, and gender diversity increase total voluntary disclosure. In contrast, chief executive officer (CEO) age decreases total voluntary disclosure. Also, although foreign ownership, institutional ownership, gender diversity, and racial diversity increase both shareholder and stakeholder CG disclosures, CEO age has a negative relationship with both shareholder and stakeholder CG disclosures. Further, board size reduces shareholder disclosure but not stakeholder disclosure. Our results further indicate that, ceteris paribus, the extent of shareholder CG disclosure relative to stakeholder CG disclosure is (a) lower with board size, gender diversity, and racial diversity and (b) higher with the level of institutional ownership. Our findings are robust across a raft of econometric techniques.

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Section: Theoretical Frameworkmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The simultaneous disclosure of shareholder and stakeholder corporate governance practices and their antecedents

Gyapong

Afrifa

2018

Int. J Fin Econ

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“…Temuan ini sejalan dengan penelitian Zhang et al, (2007) yang menemukan bahwa frekuensi rapat komite audit mempengaruhi kualitas pelaporan keuangan dan ada korelasi positif antara kedua variable tersebut. Penelitian lain melaporkan bahwa anggota komite audit yang sering melakukan rapat yang terjadwal memiliki lebih banyak waktu untuk melakukan peran pengawasan dalam pelaporan keuangan dibandingkan dengan anggota komite audit yang jarang melakukan rapat secara teratur (Chen et al, 2005;Collier & Gregory, 1999;Hoque et al, 2013;Karamanou & Vafeas, 2005;Mangena & Tauringana, 2008;Munro & Buckby, 2008). Singkatnya, elemen integrated reporting dalam annual report akan meningkat bila komite audit aktif melakukan pertemuan rutin dan terjadwal.…”

Section: Hasil Dan Pembahasanunclassified

“…(Chen, Moroney, & Houghton, 2005;Collier & Gregory, 1999;Hoque et al, 2013;Karamanou & Vafeas, 2005;Mangena & Tauringana, 2008;Munro & Buckby, 2008). Anggota komite Audit yang bertemu secara teratur sering diharapkan dapat melakukan tugas-tugas pemantauan lebih efektif daripada ang jarang melakukan pertemuan rutin.…”

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Eksplorasi Elemen Integrated Reporting Dalam Annual Reports Perusahaan Di Indonesia

Chariri

Januarti

2017

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This study aims to identify the patterns and scope of integrated reporting and to examine the effect of audit committee characteristics (expertise and meeting) on elements of integrated reporting disclosed in the annual report of companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchanges (IDX). This study used 170 annual reports of companies listed on the IDX as research data (not all companies have the required data). Research data were then analyzed using STATA / MP14 Software. The findings showed that the IDX-listed companies have presented annual reports in accordance with the elements of integated reporting although the scope of presentation was relatively low amounting of 51% (33 of 64 indicators). Furthermore, this study revealed that the audit committees' expertise (in accounting/ finance) and the frequency of audit committee meetings positively and significantly influenced the scope of the integrated reporting presented in the annual report of the companies Keywords: Integrated reporting, audit committee, accounting/financial expertise, frequency of meeting, IDX Abstract: Penelitian ini dimaksudkan untuk mengidentifikasi pola dan luas lingkup integrated reporting dan menguji pengaruh karakteristik komite audit (keahlian dan pertemuan) terhadap luas lingkup elemen integrated reporting dalam annual report perusahaan yang terdaftar di Bursa Efek Indonesia (IDX). Penelitian menggunakan 170 annual report perusahaan yang terdaftar di IDX sebagai data penelitian (tidak semua perusahaan memiliki data yang diperlukan). Data penelitian dianalisis dengan metode content analysis, statistik deskriptif dan inferensial dengan menggunakan bantuan Software STATA/MP14. Temuan penelitian menunjukkan bahwa perusahaan yang terdaftar di IDX telah menyajikan annual report sesuai dengan elemen integated reporting walaupun dengan luas penyajian yang rendah, yaitu sebesar 51% (33 dari 64 indikator). Selanjutnya, penelitian ini menyimpulkan bahwa keahlian komite audit (dalam akuntansi/keuangan) dan frekuensi rapat komite audit berpengaruh positif terhadap luas lingkup integrated reporting.

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“…This might be reassuring to those who, mindful of the agency problems of the modern corporation (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), view audit committees as having an important monitoring, supervisory or conformance role to play (see Spira and Bender, 2004). However, in the case of a minority of companies, not all audit committee members were independent according to the terms of the Code, which entails the risk that their objectivity and effectiveness in monitoring could be undermined, to the detriment of performance (see Chan and Li, 2008;Mangena and Tauringana, 2008). In some cases this appeared to be a temporary or transitional stage, but there was also evidence that some companies disagreed with the Code, particularly in relation to length of "association".…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

UK audit committees and the Revised Code

Avison

Cowton

2012

Corporate Governance: The International Journal of Business in Society

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UK audit committees and the Revised CodePurpose: The audit committee is one of the most prominent board subcommittees, having a potentially important role to play in ensuring sound corporate governance. This paper examines and discusses the behaviour of companies following revisions to the UK's Revised Code.Research design/methodology/approach: A variety of annual report data from a sample of 50 UK companies, stratified according to size, is collected and analyzed.Findings: General compliance with many provisions of the Revised Code was found. All but one company had an audit committee comprising solely nonexecutive directors. However, in about a quarter of cases the chairman was a member, and in some cases directors were not 'independent' according to the Code's definition. Nevertheless, many companies exceeded the minimum stipulated requirements, for example the number of non-executive directors on the audit committee or the number of meetings held. Some companies, though, did not follow recommended practice, particularly regarding the disclosure of information, and some explanations for non-compliance were weak. Implications:Compliance with disclosure demands regarding audit committees could be improved, as could the quality of explanations when the recommendations of the Code are not followed. It would be sensible for regulators to monitor this, provide more detailed guidance and highlight examples of good practice. Given the resistance of many companies to corporate governance regulation and accusations of 'box ticking', future research should probe why many companies do more than is required or recommended. The research should be repeated when further revisions to the Code are made in respect of audit committees, and practice in countries other than the UK should be researched to provide comparative insights. INTRODUCTIONWhen compared with the board itself, relatively little attention has been paid to board sub-committees (Spira and Bender, 2004), in spite of their growing importance. This is significant, for as corporate governance has evolved, so has the role of the audit committee, to the point where 'it is arguably the most important board subcommittee' (Mallin, 2004, p. 98). Given the place of non-executive directors (NEDs) on the audit committee, this growth in importance can be seen as part of a trend 'to establish and increase the independence and powers of non-executive directors' The aim of this paper is to determine the extent to which companies adopted the audit committee provisions of the Revised Code when it was introduced, and to identify and discuss significant issues that became apparent. Given the UK's leadership, since the publication of the Cadbury Report, in "principles-based" approaches to corporate governance, such experience is of wider significance than just the UK, providing possible lessons for other jurisdictions. The paper is structured as follows. The first main section provides a review of the literature, which falls into two broad types: first, the various policy documents t...

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Audit Committees and Voluntary External Auditor Involvement in UK Interim Reporting

Cited by 65 publications

References 49 publications

The simultaneous disclosure of shareholder and stakeholder corporate governance practices and their antecedents

The simultaneous disclosure of shareholder and stakeholder corporate governance practices and their antecedents

Eksplorasi Elemen Integrated Reporting Dalam Annual Reports Perusahaan Di Indonesia

UK audit committees and the Revised Code

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